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Saturday, June 05, 2010 06:52:54 AM

News from The Optical Industry


 

 

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NOUVEAU VISION, INC., on behalf of itself )      vs       TRANSITIONS OPTICAL, INC., ESSILOR ) OF AMERICA, INC., and ESSILOR ) LABORATORIES OF AMERICA, INC., ) and all others similarly situated, )

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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED


 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 1 of 26

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

NOUVEAU VISION, INC., on behalf of itself )
and all others similarly situated, )

) No.

Plaintiff, )

) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

  1. )

)

TRANSITIONS OPTICAL, INC., ESSILOR ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

OF AMERICA, INC., and ESSILOR )

LABORATORIES OF AMERICA, INC., )

)
Defendants. )

--------------------------~)

Nouveau Vision, Inc. ("Plaintiff'), on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated,
brings this action under the federal antitrust laws, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
15 US.C.
§§ 1,2. The allegations herein are made on information and belief, except those as to
Plaintiff, which are made on personal knowledge.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This action arises out of Defendants' and their eo-conspirators' longstanding

conspiracy to monopolize the market for the development, manufacture and sale of
pho
tochromic treatments for corrective ophthalmic lenses. Corrective ophthalmic lenses are
used in e
yeglasses to correct vision defects. Consumers of corrective ophthalmic lenses may

purchase those lenses with a photo chromic treatment to protect their eyes from ultraviolet

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 1

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL u.
38TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEA'I'I'LE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000


Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 2 of 26

1 ("VV") light, which is found in sunlight. Lenses with photochromic treatments ("photochromic

2 lenses") darken when exposed to UV light, and fade to clear when removed from DV light.

3

 

2.

 

Beginning no later than 1999 and continuing through early March of 2010, and

4 perhaps thereafter, Defendants and their eo-conspirators engaged in unfair methods of

5 competition that foreclosed key distribution channels for existing rivals and impeded market

6 entry by potential rivals into the market for photo chromic treatments. Defendants and their co-

7 conspirators engaged in acts and practices that collectively had the effect of improperly

8 maintaining Transitions' monopoly power and unreasonably restraining trade in that market.

9 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10

 

3.

 

The claims set forth in this Complaint arise under Section 2 of the Sherman

11 Antitrust Act (15 V.S.C. § 2). Plaintiff seeks treble damages pursuant to Section 4 of the

12 Clayton Act (15 U.S.c. § 15(a)).

13

 

4.

 

The jurisdiction of this Court is founded on Sections 4 and 12 and of the Clayton

14 Act (15 V.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 22), and on 28 V.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.

15

 

5.

 

Venue is proper in this District pursuant to Sections 4 and 12 of the Clayton Act

16 (15 U.S.c. §§ 15(a) and 22) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) in that Defendants are located in,

17 licensed to do business in and/or do business in this District, and a substantial part of the events

18 or occurrences giving rise to the claims alleged occurred in this District.

19 PARTIES

20

 

6.

 

Plaintiff Nouveau Vision, Inc., is a corporation organized under the laws of the

21 state of Washington, with its principal place of business in Redmond Washington. During the

22 Class Period, Plaintiff purchased photo chromic lenses directly from Defendant Essilor of

23 America, Inc.

24

 

7.

 

Defendant Transitions Optical, Inc. ("Transitions"), is a Delaware corporation

25 with its principal place of business in Pinellas Park, Florida. Transitions is ajoint venture

26 between PPG Industries Inc. ("PPG"), which owns 51 percent of Transitions, and Essilor

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 2

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL UoP
88TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622·2000


 

 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 3 of 26

1 International SA ("Essilor International"), the parent company of defendant Essilor of America,

2 Inc., which owns 49 percent of Transitions. Transitions is the nation's largest manufacturer and

3 seller of photochromic treatments, accounting for at least 80 percent of all such sales during the

4 last five years, and more than 85 percent of such sales in 2008.

5

 

8.

 

Defendant Essilor of America, Inc. ("Essilor of America"), is a Delaware

6 corporation with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas. EssiIor of America is a wholly-

7 owned subsidiary ofEssilor International, a'French corporation that is one of the world's largest

8 lens manufacturers. Essilor of America sells more lenses than any other manufacturer in the

9 United States. In recent years, Essilor International has consolidated and expanded its interests

10 in the United States.

11

 

9.

 

Defendant EssiIor Laboratories of America, Inc. ("Essilor Labs"), is a North

12 Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas. Essilor of America

13 and/or Essilor Labs own majority shares in numerous laboratories that sell photo chromic lenses

14 at the wholesale level throughout the United States, including one Jorgenson Optical Supply

15 Company in this district. Essilor of America and Essilor Labs are collectively referred to as the

16 EssiIor Defendants.

17

 

10.

 

In 2008, Essilor International's worldwide revenues were $3 billion, with 41.3

18 percent (approximately $1.27 billion) of those revenues generated in the United States, through

19 its United States interests, including Defendants and their eo-conspirators.

20 CO-CONSPIRATORS

21

 

11.

 

Co-conspirators John Does 1-150 ("John Doe Co-Conspirators") are laboratories

22 that sell Transitions photo chromic lenses at the wholesale level and, to the extent that is relevant

23 to this case, are controlled by the Essilor Defendants. See Ex. A (Essilor 2008 Registration

24 Document), at 139-40. Plaintiff cannot determine the identities of all of those laboratories from

25 records that are available to the general public, but anticipates doing so pursuant to discovery in

26 this action.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 3

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL •.•. ,
38TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000


 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 4 of 26

1
2

 

12.

 

INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators

3 manufactured, produced, sold and/or shipped substantial quantities of Transitions lenses in a

4 continuous and uninterrupted flow of transactions in interstate commerce throughout the United

5 States, including within this District. Defendants' unlawful activities that are the subject of this

6 Complaint were within the flow of, and have had a direct and substantial effect on, interstate

7 trade and commerce.

8 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

9 Distribution of Eyeglass Lenses

10
11
12
13

14
15
16

17

 

13.

America.

14.

15.

 

The distribution of ophthalmic lenses generally includes three stages. Lens

Essilor of America is the dominant lens caster in the United States, and owns at

Lens casters sell lenses to wholesale prescription optical laboratories

18

 

("Prescription Labs"). Prescription Labs grind lenses according to prescriptions from eye-care

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

 

16.

 

Certain Prescription Labs are owned by, controlled by or otherwise integrated

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 4

 

BYRNES·KELLER·CROMWELL~
38TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE. WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000

 


 

 

 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 5 of 26

1 optician services) services. Yet other Prescription Labs, including Plaintiff, operate independent

2 of any lens caster or retailer.

3

 

17.

 

During the period relevant to this Complaint, Essilor Labs has owned numerous

4 Prescription Labs throughout the United States, and acquired complete or majority ownership in

5 at least 30 Prescription Labs between 2006 and 2008.

6

 

18.

 

Photochromic lens suppliers, such as Transitions, use Prescription Labs and their

7 sales forces to market their lenses because Prescription Labs are the most efficient means to

8 communicate with the tens of thousands of independent eye-care practitioners who prescribe

9 photo chromic lenses.

10
11
12

 

19.

20.

 

Eye-care practitioners and retail chains sell finished eyeglasses to consumers.

Photochromic Lenses

Transitions treats ophthalmic lenses with photochromic treatments. Transitions

13 deals directly with lens casters only, as dealing with Prescription Labs or retailers would be

14 inefficient. Lens casters provide Transitions with untreated lenses, to which Transitions applies

15 photo chromic materials.

16

 

21.

 

Transitions sells photo chromic lenses back to the lens casters from whom it

17 received them, after which they are distributed via the above-referenced distribution chain.

18 Transitions' Exclusionary Practices at the Lens Caster Level

19

 

22.

 

During the period relevant to this Complaint, Transitions, through exclusive

20 dealing arrangements with lens casters, including written agreements, foreclosed its competitors

21 from dealing with those lens casters, which collectively accounted for over 80 percent of

22 photo chromic lens sales in the United States.

23

 

23.

 

Transitions maintained its dominance by exclusionary policies at nearly every

24 level of the photo chromic lens distribution chain.

25

 

24.

 

At the lens caster level - the only effective distribution channel for photochromic

26 treatments - Transitions' anti competitive polices included, but were not limited to: (1) adopting

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 5

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL .•. ,
S8THFLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE. WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000


 

Case 2: 1 O-cv-00547 -JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 6 of 26

1 and announcing a general policy that it would not deal with lens casters that sold or promoted

2 any competing photo chromic lens; (2) exclusive agreements with certain lens casters, including

3 Essilor of America; (3) threatening to terminate its dealings with lens casters that would not sell

4 Transitions' lenses on an exclusive basis; and (4) terminating a lens caster that developed a

5 competing photo chromic treatment.

6

 

25.

 

Transitions made its intentions clear in 1999, when a rival, Coming Inc.

7 ("Corning") introduced a competitive photochromic lens product, SunSensors. Transitions

8 responded to the competitive threat by terminating the first lens caster to sell SunSensors lenses,

9 Signet Armorlite, Inc.1 ("Signet").

10

 

26.

 

Transitions thereafter refused to deal with any lens caster that sold or promoted a

11 competing photochromic lens. Transitions enforced that exclusionary policy by, among other

12 things, entering into agreements with certain lens casters that expressly require exclusivity, and

13 by publicizing its exclusive dealing policy in the marketplace.

14

 

27.

 

For example, in 2005 when lens caster Vision-Ease Lens ("Vision-Ease")

15 introduced its own brand of photo chromic lenses, LifeRx, Transitions refused to deal with

16 Vision-Ease. Vision-Ease was able to keep its LifeRx product on the market only by entering

17 into secret negotiations with one of the largest optical retailers in the United States, who

18 committed to providing Vision-Ease with enough business to replace its lost Transitions sales.

19

 

28.

 

Transitions' exclusionary policies at the lens caster level effectively precluded

20 even those lens casters that have not signed exclusivity agreements with Transitions from dealing

21 with Transitions' competitors, as those lens casters were aware of Transitions' policy.

22

 

29.

 

Because of Transitions' dominant market position and its exclusivity demands,

23 lens casters were faced with: (1) losing Transitions' business, which accounted for at least 40

24 percent of most lens casters' revenues, or (2) endangering their sales of clear lenses, as many

25

26

 

1 Consistent with Defendants' general practice, Essilor International permanently removed
Signet as a competitive threat recently, when EOA Holding Co., Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary
ofEssilor International, purchased Signet. See Ex. B (Essilor press release, Jan. 15,2009).

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 6

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL LLP
38TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEA'ITLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000

 


 

 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 7 of 26

1 retailers and Prescription Labs prefer to buy both clear and photo chromic versions of the same

2 lenses. Losing the ability to sell Transitions lenses to those Prescription Labs and retailers -

3 many of whom have their own exclusivity agreement with Transitions - would deprive any

4 affected lens caster of substantial numbers of potential customers.

5

 

30.

 

Lens casters that are exclusive to Transitions collectively account for over 85

6 percent of photo chromic lens sales in the United States:

7

 

31.

 

Through its contracts and policies, Transitions has deprived Coming and other

8 rival and potential rival photo chromic treatment suppliers of the most effective distribution

9 channel-lens casters - thereby removing them as a competitive threat to Transitions' monopoly

10 and effectively deterring such firms from investing in research and development to improve the

11 photochromic products on the market today.

12

 

32.

 

Lens casters who might have otherwise developed their own photochromic

13 treatments have learned from the Vision-Ease experience that they cannot do so absent a

14 commitment from a large optical retailer to carry the resulting products. Since Transitions

15 terminated Vision-Ease for introducing LifeRx in 2005, no other lens caster has introduced a

16 new line of photo chromic lenses in the United States.

17 Transitions' Exclusionary Practices at the Prescription Lab Level

18

 

33.

 

At least half of all Prescription Labs in the United States - including labs owned

19 by the Essilor Defendants - are owned by lens casters that sell only Transitions' photo chromic

20 lenses, thereby substantially eliminating access to those labs for rival photo chromic treatment

21 suppliers.

22

 

34.

 

So as to limit its competitors' access to independent Prescription Labs as a

23 distribution channel, Transitions has entered into agreements with over 100 Prescription Labs,

24 including 23 of the 30 largest independent Prescription Labs, requiring that those Prescription

25 Labs sell Transitions' lenses as their preferred photochromic lens, and minimize their promotion

26 of competing photo chromic lenses.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 7

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL ~.
88TH
FLoOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEA'ITLE. WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000

 


 

 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 8 of 26

35. Transitions' exc1usionary Prescription Lab agreements, combined with its

2 agreements with lens casters that own over half of the Prescription Labs in the United States,

3 minimize the ability of Transitions' rivals to promote and sell their photochromic lenses to

4 independent eye-care practitioners (i.e., practitioners unaffiliated with retail chains).

5 Transitions' Exclusionary Practices at the Optical Retailer Level

6

 

36.

 

Transitions also directed its exclusionary practices at Prescription Labs and

7 optical retailers via: (1) long-term exclusionary agreements with most major retailers; (2)

8 agreements with Prescription Labs requiring that they promote Transitions' lenses as their

9 preferred photo chromic lens and strictly limit their sales efforts for competing photochromic

10 lenses; and (3) offering discounts only to retailers who sold extremely high percentages of

11 Transitions' photo chromic lenses, as compared to Transitions' competitors.

12

 

37.

 

These agreements foreclosed downstream outlets for photo chromic lenses and

13 created significant barriers to entry to rival photo chromic treatment suppliers.

14

 

38.

 

Large optical retailers are one of the most efficient channels of distribution for

15 photochromic lenses to consumers. After terminating Vision-Ease for developing and selling a

16 competing photo chromic lens, Transitions entered into exclusive contracts with over 50 optical

17 retailers, including many of the largest retail chains. Most of these exclusive agreements were

18 long-term and included provisions making termination onerous.

19

 

39.

 

Transitions' actions effectively excluded Vision-Ease, other rivals and potential

20 rivals from an efficient distribution channel.

21

 

40.

 

Transitions' conduct minimized the effect of Vision-Ea se's entry into the market,

22 deterred potential competitors from attempting to enter the market and effectively prevented

23 Vision-Ease or any other rival photo chromic suppliers from restraining Transitions' exercise of

24 monopoly power.

25
26

. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 8

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL u.>
38THFLOoll

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(Z06) 622-2000

 


 

 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 9 of 26

1
2

 

41.

 

Transitions' Anticompetitive Bundled Discounts

Transitions' agreements with Prescription Labs and optical retailers generally

3 provide for discounts only to customers who purchase all or almost all of their photochromic lens

4 needs from Transitions.

5

 

42.

 

No other photo chromic treatment supplier has a treatment that applies to a full

6 line of ophthalmic lenses. Transitions' discount structure thus impairs its competitors' ability to

7 compete for sales to those customers, as those customers can neither discontinue nor limit their

8 sales of Transitions' products.

9

 

43.

 

Transitions' bundled discount arrangements erect a significant entry barrier by

10 limiting the ability of rival photochromic treatment suppliers to enter the market with new

11 photo chromic treatments suitable for anything less than a full line of lenses. Those arrangements

12 also strengthen the barriers to entry erected by Transitions' policy of requiring that lens casters

13 deal exclusively with Transitions.

14

 

44.

 

Transitions' exclusionary practices in dealing with Prescription Labs and optical

15 retailers foreclose its rivals, in whole or in part, from substantial shares of the photo chromic lens

16 market at those levels.

17 Essilor Defendants' Conspiracy

18

 

45.

 

At all relevant times, Essilor of America purchased and sold no photochromic

19 lenses other than Transitions' photochromic lenses. However, unlike other lens casters that

20 entered into exclusive agreements with Transitions, Essilor of America did so in whole or in

21 substantial part to bolster Transitions' monopoly in the relevant market.

22

 

46.

 

Essilor of America also entered into exclusive agreements with multiple

23 Prescription Labs and optical retailers, which required those purchasers to sell and/or actively

24 promote only Essilor lenses. A necessary result of those agreements was to bolster Transitions'

25 monopoly in the relevant market.

26

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 9

 

BYRNES + KELLER • CROMWELL ~
38TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622.2000

 


 

 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 10 of 26

1

 

47.

 

At all relevant times after their purchase by one or more of the Essilor

2 Defendants, the John Doe Cc-Conspirators purchased and sold Transitions photochromic lenses

3 on a substantially exclusive basis. However, unlike other Prescription Labs that entered into

4 exclusive agreements with Transitions, the John Doe Co-Conspirators did so in whole or in

5 substantial part to bolster Transitions' monopoly in the relevant market.

6 FTC Action Against Transitions

7

 

48.

 

On March 3, 2010, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") accepted for public

8 comment an Agreement Containing Consent Order to Cease and Desist with Transitions.

9

 

49.

 

The FTC concurrently released a proposed complaint against Transitions (the

10 "FTC Complaint") and the Decision and Order (the "Order") that resulted from its investigation.

11
12

 

50.

 

(a)

 

a relevant market for the development, manufacture and sale of

13 photochromic treatments for corrective ophthalmic lenses (the "Photo chromic Treatment

14
15
16
17
18

 

 

Market");

(b)

(c)

Cd)

Market;

(e)

 

there are no close substitutes for photochromic lenses;

Transitions has monopoly power in the Photo chromic Treatment Market;
there are significant barriers to entry into the Photochromic Treatment

20 power in the Photochromic Treatment Market; and

21

 

(t)

 

the anticompetitive effects of Transitions' conduct include: (1) increasing

22 the prices and reducing the output of photochromic lenses; (2) deterring, delaying and impeding

23 the ability of Transitions' actual or potential competitors to enter or to expand their sales in the

24 Photo chromic Treatment Market; (3) reducing innovation; and (4) reducing consumer choice

25 among competing photochromic lenses.

26

 

51.

 

Among other things, the Order:

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 10

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL u.
38TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000

 


 

 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 11 of 26

1

 

(a)

 

prohibits Transitions from entering into any agreements or adopting any

2 policies that limit its customers' ability to buy or sell competing photo chromic treatments, or that

3 require customers to give Transitions' products preferential treatment as compared to its

4 competitors' products;

5

 

(b)

 

prohibits Transitions from entering into exclusive agreements relating to

6 photo chromic lenses, or a number of related products and services;

7

 

(c)

 

prohibits Transitions from offering discounts that are based on the degree

8 to which its customers sell Transitions' photochromic lenses as compared to its competitors;

9

 

(d)

 

prohibits Transitions from offering discounts that are applied retroactively

10 after a customer's sales reach a specific threshold; and

11

 

(e)

 

prohibits Transitions from bundling discounts such that customers

12 purchasing more than one line of photo chromic lenses obtain additional discounts.

13 RELEVANT MARKET

14

 

52.

 

The relevant market is the development, manufacture and sale of photochromic

15 treatments for corrective ophthalmic lenses in the United States - the Photo chromic Treatment

16 Market.

17

 

53.

 

Photo chromic lenses have characteristics and uses distinct from those of clear

18 corrective ophthalmic lenses, polarized lenses (which are designed to remove glare), and fixed-

19 tint lenses (prescription sunglasses).

20

 

54.

 

There are no close substitutes for photochromic lenses, and no other product

21 significantly constrains the prices of photochromic lenses.

22

 

55.

 

In 2008, photo chromic lenses represented approximately 19 percent of all

23 corrective ophthalmic lenses sold in the United States, totaling approximately $630 million in

24 sales at the wholesale level.

25
26

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 11

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL u.P
38TH FLOOl!

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000

 


 

 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 12 of 26

 

.. ,

TRANSITIONS HOLDS MONOPOLY POWER IN THE RELEVANT MARKET

2

 

56.

 

Transitions possesses monopoly power in the relevant market. Transitions'share

3 of the relevant market has been at least 80 percent during each of the past five years. In 2008,

4 Transitions' market share was over 85 percent.

5

 

57.

 

Significant and lasting barriers make entry into the relevant market difficult.

6 These barriers include, but are not limited to: (i) product development costs; (ii) capital

7 requirements; (iii) intellectual property rights; (iv) regulatory requirements; and (v) Transitions'

8 unfair methods of competition.

9

 

58.

 

Transitions' monopoly power is also reflected by its ability to exclude

10 competitors and to control prices. The indicia of Transitions' monopoly power include, but are

11 not limited to, Transitions' ability to: (i) coerce lens casters to accept exclusive dealing

12 arrangements; (ii) price its products without regard to its competitors' prices; (iii) impose

13 significant price increases; and (iv) withhold a desired product - a low-priced, private label

14 photochromic lens - from consumers in the United States, even though Transitions supplies it in

15 other markets.

16 CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

 

59.

60.

 

Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

All persons or entities that purchased Transitions lenses directly
from Defendants or any of the John Doe Co-Conspirators at any
time during the four years preceding the date of this Complaint
(the "Class Period"). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and
their subsidiaries, parents, or affiliates, Defendants' eo-
conspirators, whether or not named as a Defendant in this
Complaint
, and government entities.

The Class is individually so numerous that joinder of all members is

26 impracticable. While the exact number of members of the Class is unknown to Plaintiff at this

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 12

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL u..
38THFLOOll

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000


 

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC       Document 1

Filed 03/30/2010         Page 13 of 26

15      Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action and antitrust litigation.

time, based on the nature of the trade and commerce involved, Plaintiff reasonably believes that

there are at least hundreds of members in the Class and that their identities can be learned from

records in Defendants' possession, custody or control. Class members are geographically

dispersed throughout the United States.

61.

Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the other members ofthe Class.

Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all sustained damage in that during the Class Period

they purchased Transitions lenses directly from a Defendant or a John Doe Co-Conspirator at

artificially maintained, non-competitive prices, established by the Defendants' actions in

connection with the anticompetitive behavior alleged herein. Defendants' anticompetitive

conduct, the effects of such violations, and the relief sought are all issues or questions that are

common to Plaintiff and the other Class members.

62.

Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the

Hi      Plaintiff's interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, the interests of the other Class

17      members.

18
19
20

21

22

23

24
25

26

63.      . Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and

predominate over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class.

64.

The common questions of law and fact common to the Class include, but are not

limited to:

(a)

whether the development, manufacture and sale of photochromic
treatments for corrective ophthalmic lenses in the United States (the
"Photo chromic Treatment Market") is the relevant market in this case;

(b)

whether Transitions possesses monopoly power in the Photochromic
Treatment Market;

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 13

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL u>
S8THFLOOR

1000 SECONDAVENtJE

SEATTLE. W.\SHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000



 

 

1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC       Document 1

Filed 03/30/2010         Page 14 of 26

(c)

whether, through the conduct alleged herein, Transitions willfully
acquired, maintained and enhanced its monopoly power in the
Photochromic Treatment Market;

(d)

whether, through the conduct alleged herein, Defendants and the John Doe
Co-Conspirators conspired to confer, maintain or enhance Transitions'
monopoly power in the Photo chromic Treatment Market;

(e)

whether Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators conspired to
engage in unlawful exclusionary conduct to impair the opportunities of
Transitions' rivals in the Photo chromic Treatment Market;

(f)

whether Transitions entered into exclusionary agreements that
unreasonably restrained trade and impaired its rivals in the Photo chromic
Treatment Market;

(g)

whether Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators engaged in a
contract, combination or conspiracy among themselves to unreasonably
restrain trade and impair Transitions' rivals in the Photochromic
Treatment Market;

(h)

whether and to what extent, Defendants' and the John Doe Co-
Conspirators' conduct caused Class members to pay supra-competitive
prices and, thereby, suffer antitrust injuries; and

(i)

whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to any damages and, if
so, the appropriate Class-wide measure of damages.

65.

A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable.

The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would impose heavy

burdens upon the courts and Defendants, and would create a risk of inconsistent or varying

adjudications of the questions oflaw and fact common to the Class. A class action would

achieve substantial economies of time, effort and expense, and would assure uniformity of

decision as to persons similarly situated without sacrificing procedural fairness. There will be no

material difficulty in the management of this action as a class action on behalf of the Class.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 14

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL ~
88TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE. WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000



 

 

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Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC     Document 1

Filed 03/30/2010         Page 15 of 26

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Violation of Section 2 ofthe Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 V.S.C. § 2: Monopolization

Against Defendant Transitions Only

           66.       Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding allegations.

67.

Transitions acquired, willfully maintained and unlawfully exercised monopoly

power in the relevant market through the exclusionary, anticompetitive conduct set forth above,

including, but not limited to:

(a)

at the lens caster level: (1) adopting and publicly announcing a general

policy of refusing to deal with lens casters that sell or promote any competing photo chromic

lens; (2) entering into exclusive agreements with certain lens casters; (3) threatening to terminate

lens casters that would not sell Transitions' lenses on an exclusive basis; and (4) terminating a

lens caster that developed a competing photo chromic treatment; and

(b)

at the Prescription Lab and optical retailer levels: (1) entering into long-

term exclusionary agreements with most major optical retailers; (2) entering into agreements

with Prescription Labs requiring that they promote Transitions' lenses as their preferred

photo chromic lens and withhold normal sales efforts for competing photo chromic lenses; and (3)

offering discounts only to customers who sold only or almost only Transitions' photochromic

lenses.

68.

There is no legitimate business justification for Transitions' actions and the

23      conduct through which it maintained 'its monopoly power in the relevant market.

24
25
26

69.

Transitions has effectively excluded competition from the relevant market,

maintained its dominant market share in the relevant market, and profited from its

anticompetitive conduct by excluding less expensive, superior competitive products, by

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT -15

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL wo
88'1'HFLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE. WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000


 

 

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16

1
2

Case 2:10-cv-00547-JCC        Document 1

Filed 03/30/2010         Page 16 of 26

maintaining prices at artificially high levels, and by reaping the benefits of its illegally obtained

and maintained monopoly power.

70.

The anticompetitive effects of Transitions' conduct far outweigh any conceivable

procompetitive benefits or justifications.

71.

Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or property

by Transitions' monopolization of the relevant market. Without limiting the generality of the

foregoing, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have been forced to pay higher prices for

photo chromic lenses, including Transitions lenses, than they would have paid absent Transitions'

unlawful conduct.

72.

COUNTll

Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 D.S.C. § 2:

Conspiracy to Monopolize

Against All Defendants

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding allegations.

73.

As set forth above, the Essilor Defendants actively facilitated Transitions' efforts

17      to acquire, willfully maintain and unlawfully exercise monopoly power in the relevant market

18      through the excIusionary, anti competitive conduct set forth above, including, but not limited to:

19
20
21
22
23
24

(a)
(b)

purchasing and selling only Transitions' photo chromic lenses;

exercising their control over the John Doe Co-Conspirators to induce them

to substantially limit their purchases and sales of photo chromic lenses to Transitions

photo chromic lenses; and

(c)

in the case of Essilor of America, entering into agreements that effectively

25      induced its Prescription Lab customers (other than the JOM Doe Co-Conspirators) to purchase

26      and sell only Transitions' photo chromic lenses.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 16

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL U.P
38TH FLOOI!

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000



 

 

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21

22

23
24
25
26

Filed 03/30/2010         Page 17 of 26

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC       Document 1

74.

Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators sought to obtain, maintain and

1
2

enhance Transitions' monopoly power in the Photo chromic Treatments Market beginning no

later than 1999 when Transitions began implementing exclusionary contracts with lens casters,

including Essilor of America, to thwart competition from Corning and other potential rivals.

75.

Pursuant to their anti-competitive conspiracy, the Essilor Defendants agreed to

enter into anticompetitive exclusionary agreements, with Transitions, with each other, with the

John Doe Co-Conspirators, and with their respective non-conspiring customers, that effectively

blocked rival photochromic treatment suppliers from contracting with the Essilor Defendants and

prevented those rivals from distributing through the John Doe Co-Conspirators.

           76.       Each of the Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators has committed at least

one overt act - such as entering into exclusionary agreements and selling Transitions lenses at

supra-competitive prices - to further the conspiracy.

77.

Each of the Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators intended that the

conspiracy to monopolize alleged herein would maintain and enhance Transitions' monopoly

power and injure Plaintiff and the Class thereby.

78.

Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or property

by Defendants' antitrust violations. The injury to Plaintiff and the Class consists of paying

artificially inflated prices for photo chromic lenses, including Transitions lenses. Such injury, in

the form of overcharges, is the type of injury the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and

flows directly from Defendants' unlawful conduct.

ANTI COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT

79.

The effects of Defendants' anticompetitive exclusionary acts have been to capture

and/or maintain for Transitions more than 80 percent of the relevant market, to substantially

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 17

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL ....,.
38TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE. WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000


 

 

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4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16

17
18

19

20

21
22
23
24
25
26

Case 2:1 O-cv-00547-JCC      Document 1

Filed 03/30/2010         Page ·18 of 26

impair and foreclose competition from Transitions' rivals in the Photochromic Treatment

Market, and to significantly raise barriers to entry for potential rivals.

80.

Defendants' conduct adversely affects competition and consumers by (1)

increasing the prices and reducing the output of photo chromic lenses; (2) deterring, delaying and

impeding the ability of Transitions' actual or potential competitors to enter or to expand their

sales in the Photo chromic Treatment Market; (3) reducing innovation; and (4) reducing

consumer choice among competing photochromic lenses.

81.

Absent Defendants' conduct and the substantial foreclosure and impairment of

effective competition caused by such conduct, Transitions, as a rational actor, would have

reduced the price it charged to lens casters for its photo chromic treatment of lenses and/or

supplied its low-priced, private label photochromic lens (which it offers outside of the United

States where it faces increased competition) in response to added unimpaired competition from

Coming, Vision-Ease and other rivals and potential rivals (i. e., Prescription Labs and/or lens

casters that could have or would have developed their own photo chromic treatments). Moreover,

had actual or potential photo chromic treatment suppliers not been substantially foreclosed or

stifled by Defendants' anti competitive conduct from effectively competing in the market for such

products, those competitors and/or potential competitors would have sold much more of their

products, gained a larger market share and achieved economies of scale and scope that could

have further driven down prices in the marketplace.

82.

By unlawfully excluding and impairing competition, Defendants' conduct has

caused Plaintiff and other Class members to pay more for photo chromic lenses than they

otherwise would have paid absent Transitions' illegal, exc1usionary conduct.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 18

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL ~
38TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000



 

 

8
9
10
11

12
13
14

15

16
17
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21
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23
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25
26

1
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4
5
6

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC       Document 1

Filed 03/30/2010         Page 19 of 26

DAMAGES

83.

As a result of Defendants' illegal conduct, members of the Class were compelled

to pay, and did pay, artificially inflated prices for the Transitions lenses they purchased. Had

potential competitors been able to enter the market unirnpeded by Defendants' illegal conduct (or

been a threat to enter the market), Plaintiff and other members of the Class would have been able

7

to, inter alia, purchase less expensive photo chromic lenses. The prices that Plaintiff and other

Class members paid for photo chromic lenses during the Class Period were substantially greater

than the prices they would have paid absent the illegal exc1usionary conduct alleged herein

because: (a) the prices of all photo chromic lenses were artificially inflated by Transitions' illegal

conduct - as competitors were deprived of economies of scale and efficient distribution channels

_ and (b) Class members were deprived of the opportunity to purchase competing photochromic

lenses and to purchase those lenses at lower prices. Members of the Class have, as a

consequence, sustained losses and damage to their business and property in the form of

overcharges. The full amount of such damages will be calculated after discovery and upon proof

at trial.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the following:

A.

Certification of the Class proposed in this Complaint;

B.

Defendants' actions described herein be adjudged and decreed to be in violation

of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 V.S.C. § 2;

C.

Plaintiff and the Class recover damages, as provided by law, that they are

determined to have sustained, and that judgment in favor of plaintiff be entered

against Defendants;

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 19

BYRNES.KELLER·CROMWELL~
88TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622-2000


 

Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1

 

Filed 03/30/2010 Page 20 of 26

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21
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26

 

D.

E.

 

Plaintiff and the Class recover their costs of this suit, including reasonable

attorneys' fees, as provided by law; and

Plaintiff and the Class be granted such other, further and different relief as the

nature of the case may require or as may seem just and proper to this Court.

By Isl Paul R. Taylor

Paul R. Taylor, WSBA #14851
Bymes Keller Cromwell LLP

1000 Second Avenue, 38th Floor
Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 622-2000

Fax: (206) 622-2522
ptaylor@byrneskeller.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

Of counsel:

BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
H. Laddie Montague, Jr.

Merrill G. Davidoff

Bart D. Cohen

Andrew C. Curley

1622 Locust Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

(215) 875-3000

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 20

 

BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL wo
38TH FLOOR

1000 SECOND AVENUE

SEATI'LE. WASHINGTON 98104

(206) 622.2000

 


 

 

Case 2:10-cv-00547-JCC Document 1 Filed 03/30/2010 Page 21 of 26

EXHIBIT A

Case 2:10-cv-00547-JCC

Document 1

Filed 03/30/2010

Page 23 of 26

FINANCIAL INFORMATION CONCERNING ASSETS AND UABILITIES, FINANCIAL rosmos AND PROFITS AND LOSSES

20

2008 Consoudated financial statements

NOTE 32.

LIST OF FULLY-CONSOLIDATED COMPANIES

•· ...•. ~" •. M.···· .•. ·MM_"_ ... no.'~ •. " M

"H"""H"""".,~,,,M ••,,_"'HH'_"·"····H""'_'H_H_

••••••••••_ ••••• H." ••••• H • "' •••••• ,,, ••,,,·,,,,,,,,, __ , ••• __ ." •••••

... , .... "." .... ".,." ...... " .. " .....

••••_____ H •• H ••••••• __ ••• H •••• _. ____ ••••••• H

%

%

voting

%

voting

%

Company

Country

rights

interest

Company

Country

rights

interest

FRANCE

Optilens Italla s.r.I.

Italy

100

100

BBGR

France

100

100

Satlsloh Italia

Italy

100

100

BNL Eurolens

France

100

100

Essllor Norge A.S.

Norway

100

100

Oelamare Sovra

France

100

100

Sentralslip

Norway

80

Ba

Essldev

France

100

100

Essilor Nederland BV

Netherlands

100

100

Invoptic

France

100

100

Essllor Nederland Holding BV

Netherlands

100

100

Mega Optics

France

75

75

Holland Optical Corp. BV

Netherlands

100

100

Novacel

France

75

75

Holland Optical Instruments BV

Netherlands

74

74

Novisla

France

100

100

Omax

Netherlands

51

51

OMI

France

100

100

Essilor Optical laboratory

Optlm

France

100

100

Polska Sp. Z.o.o.

Poland

100

100

Satisloh SAS

France

100

100

Essilor Polonia

Poland

100

100

l1kal Vision (ex Barbara)

France

100

100

Esslfor Portugal

Portugal

100

100

Essilor Romania SRL

Romania

100

100

EUROPE

100

100

Omega Slovakia

Slovakia

Ba

Ba

BBGRGmbH

Germany

100

100

Essllor 0.0.0 Slovehla

Slovenla

100

100

Essilor GmbH

Germany

Germany

7S

7S

Essilor AB

Sweden

100

100

Nlka

Rupp & Hubrach Optik Gmbh

Germany

100.

100

BBGR Skandinavlska

Sweden

100

100

Satisloh Gmbh

Germany

100

100

Essilor (Sulsse) SA

Switzerland

100

100

100

100

Satisloh Holding AG

Switzerland

100

100

Essllor Austria Gmbh

Austria

Essllor Belgium S.A.

Belgium

100

100

SatislohAG

Switzerland

100

100

Satisloh Photonies AG

Switzerland

100

100

Essllor Croatla

Croatia

100

100

Denmark

100

100

Vaco Holding SA

Switzerland

100

100

Essilor Danmark A.S.

BBGR lens Iberia S.A.

Spain

100

100

Essllor Optika Spol s.r.o.

Czech Rep.

100

100

Essilor Espana SA

Spain

100

100

Omega

Czech Rep.

BO

80

Satlsloh lberica

Spain

100

100

Essllor Optika 000

Russia

100

100

Essllor QY

Rnland

100

100

NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA

BBGR United Kingdom

United Kingdom

100

100

Aries Optical Ltd.

Canada

100

100

Essllor lid

United Kingdom

100

100

BBGR Optique Canada Inc.

Canada

100

100

Essilor European Shared

Canoptec Inc.

Canada

100

100

Service Center Ud.

United Kingdom

100

100

CUstom Surface ltd.

Canada

100

100

Satlsloh Ltd

United Kingdom

100

100

Eastern Optical laboratories Ltd.

Canada

100

100

Slnclalr Optical laboratories

United Kingdom

100

100

Essilor Canada Ltd.

Canada

100

100

United Optical La boratories

United Kingdom

80

BO

Groupe Vision Optique

Canada

100

100

Essllor Optika Kit

Hungary

100

100

K&W Optical Ltd.

Canada

100

100

Athlone

Ireland

Ba

80

Metro Optical Ltd.

Canada

100

100

Essllor Ireland (branch)

Ireland

100

100

Morrison Optical

Canada

100

100

Essllor Ireland (Sales) Ltd

Ireland

100

100

OK Lenscraft Laboratories Ltd.

Canada

100

100

Orqanic Lens Manufacturing

OPSG Ltd.

Canada

100

100

(branch)

Ireland

100

100

Optical Software Inc

Canada

100

100

ATR MEC OptIcal Mlfano s.r.l.

Italy

100

100

Optique de l'Estrie Inc.

Canada

100

100

Esslfor Italla S.pA

Italy

100

100

Optique Uson Inc.

Canada

100

100

LTl S.p.A.

Italy

100

100

70

Optique Cristal

Canada

70

Oltalmika Galileo Spa

Italy

100

100

Perspectics

Canada

100

100

ESSILOR -2008 Registration Document and Annual Financial Report

139

Case 2:1 O-cv-00547-JCC

Document 1

Filed 0313012010

Page 24 of 26

20

FINANCIAL INFORMATION CONCERNING ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, FINANCIAL PosmON AND PROFITS AND LOSSES

2008 ConsalidateC financial statements

%

%

voting

%

voting

%

Company

Country

rights

Interest

Company

Country

rights

interest

Pioneer Optical Inc.

Canada

100

100

Optical Suppliers Inc. (Hawa'O

USA

85

85

Pro Optic canada Inc.

Canada

100

100

Optifacts Inc.

USA

100

100

R&R Optical Laboratory Ud.

Canada

100

100

Optimatnx

USA

80

80

SOL

canada

90

90

Ozarks Optical Laboratories

USA

80

80

Westlab

canada

85

85

Pech Optical

USA

80

80

21st Century Optics Inc.

USA

80

80

Perferx Optical Co Inc

USA

80

80

Accu Rx Inc

USA

80

80

Personnal Eyes

USA

80

80

Advance Optical

USA

90

90

Peninsula Optical Lab.

USA

80

80

Beitler Mc Kee Company

USA

90

90

Predsion Optical Lab. (Tennessee)

USA

80

80

Collard Rose

USA

80

80

Precision Optical Co. (Connecticut)

USA

80

80

Dependable

USA

80

80

Satlsloh Inc

USA

100

100

Deschutes

USA

80

80

Select Optical Inc.

USA

100

100

Dibok Aspen Optical

USA

80

80

Southwest lens

USA

65

65

Dunlaw Optical Laboratories Inc.

USA

80

80

Speciality Lens Corp.

USA

100

100

ELOA california Acquisition Corp.

USA

100

100

Stereo Optical Co. Inc.

USA

100

100

Empire

USA

85

85

SunStar Inc.

USA

80

80

EOA Investment Inc.

USA

100

100

Sutherlln Optical Company

USA

85

85

Essllor Latin America &

Trl Supreme Optical LLC

USA

100

100

Caribbean Inc.

USA

100

100

Uniscoat Inc.

USA

100

100

Essilor Laboratories of America

ViSion-Craft Inc.

USA

BD

BO

Corporation

USA

100

100

Essilor laboratories of America

Essilor Mexico

Mexico

100

100

Holding Co Inc.

USA

100

100

Soli de Chihuahua

Mexico

100

100

Essilor Laboratories Of America

Vision Center S.A. de C.V.

Mexico

100

100

Holding II

USA

100

100

Rainbow Optical

Puerto Rico

100

100

Essilor laboratories of America,

OTHER

Inc (indus Laboratolres US)

USA

100

100

Essl/or Laboratories of America,

Essl/or South Africa <pty> Ltd.

South Africa

100

100

LP (indus Avisia, Omega, Duffens)

USA

100

100

Essl/or Argentine S.A.

Argentina

100

100

Essllor of America Holding Co Inc.

USA

100

100

AR Coating SA

Argentina

95

95

Essilor of America Inc.

USA

100

100

City Optical Pty Ltd.

Australia

100

100

Eye care Express Lab Inc

USA

80

80

Essilor Australia Pty Ltd.

Australia

100

100

Focus Optical Labs, lnc

USA

80

80

Essilor Laboratory SOuth Australia

Future Optics Inc

USA

80

80

Pty Ltd.

Australia

100

100

Gentex Optics Inc.

USA

100

100

Essilor Laboratories of Australia

Pty Ltd.

Australia

100

100

Homer Optical

USA

100

100

Essilor Laboratory Western Australia Australia

100

100

Interstate Optical

USA

80

80

Essl/or Lens Australia pty Ltd.

Australia

100

100

Jorgenson Optical Supply 01.

USA

80

Ba

Hobart Optical

Australia

100

100

MGM

USA

BD

Ba

Tee Optik

Australia

100

100

Midland Optical

USA

80

80

Brasllor Partidpacoes Se Ltda.

Brazil

100

100

Nassau Lens Co Inc.

USA

100

100

Essllor Da Amazonia Industria e

Next generation

USA

100

100

Commerclo Ltda.

Brazil

100

100

NOA

USA

100

100

Multi Optica Distrlbuidora Ltda.

Brazil

100

100

Omega Optical General Inc.

USA

100

100

Sudop Industria Optica Ltda.

Brazil

100

100

Omega Optical Holdings Inc.

USA

100

100

Polyllte BeIJlng

O1ina

51

51

OOGP

USA

BD

80

Polilyte Shanghai

China

51

51

Opal Lite Inc.

USA

100

100

Satisloh Zhongshan

China

100

100

Optical One

USA

80

80

Satisfoh Schenzen

China

100

100

140

ESSILOR -2008 Registration Document and Annual Financial Report

 


 

 

 

Case 2:10-cv-00547-JCC Document 1 Filed 03/30/2010 Page 25 of 26

EXHIBITB

Case 2: 1 0-cv-00547 -JCC

 

Document 1

... @)

 

Filed 03/30/2010

 

Page 26 of 26

essiLor

NEWS RELEASE

Essilor agrees to acquire Signet Armorlite

Cherenton-le-Pont (January 15, 2009 - 6:30 a.m.) - Essllor International announced today that its US
subsidiary, EOA Holding Go. Inc., has signed a share purchase agreement whereby it has offered to
acquire the entire capital of Signet Armorlite, a manufacturer of ophthalmic lenses. The agreement is
subject to certain standard conditions precedent, including approval by competition authorities in Signet
Armorlite's main host countries
. The acquisition is expected to be completed in the first half of the year.

Headquartered in California in the United States, it has revenues of over $130 million, approximately
900 employees, one manufacturing plant in Mexico, four prescription laboratories in the United States
and Europe, and three distribution centers in Canada, Portugal and the Netherlands.

Signet Armorllte specializes in entry-level and mid-range products for independent eyecare
professionals and integrated retailers. It also manufactures lenses under the Kodak brand, for which it is
the exclusive licensed manufacturer and distributor. Led by its current management team
, Signet
Armorlite will continue to produce, market and distribute ophthalmic lenses under the Kodak brand.

Essilor International is the world leader in ophthalmic optical products, offering a wide range of lenses
under the flagship
vetilux", cnzet", Essilo,s and Detinity" brands to correct myopia, hyperopia,
presbyopia and astigmatism. Essilor operates worldwide through
15 production sites, 270 lens finishing
laboratories and focal distribution networks. The Essilor share trades on the Euronext Paris market and
is included in the GAG 40 index. (lSIN: FR 0000121667; Reuters: ESSf.PA; Bloomberg: EI:FP).

Investor Relations and Financial Communications
Veronique Gillet - Sebastlen Leroy

Phone; +33 (0)149774216
www.essllor.com

1/1

 

 

 

 

 


Agency: Federal Trade Commission

 

FTC Document


Comment Number: 547136-00001
Received: 3/3/2010 7:19:44 PM
Organization: Opti-Con Inc.
Commenter: David Panichello
State: OR
Agency: Federal Trade Commission
Rule: Proposed Consent Agreement In the Matter of Transitions Optical, Inc., FTC File No. 091-0062
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Comments:

To whom it may concern: This is a response to your ruling "against" Transitions Optical. Although the issues between manufacturers of photochromic materials "should" be resolved with your 4-0 vote and ruling, please look at the "bigger" picture with Essilor in the focus of your lenses. You must be aware Essilor is a 49% shareholder of Transitions Optical with PPG Industries. The FTC has not done enough to limit the domination Essilor continues to have in the wholesale manufacturing of optical lenses with or without this ruling. We expect Essilor uses the profits from all of its world wide businesses to nearly completely dominate the wholesale optical lens manufacturing business in the United States today. Although the "rest of the world" is outside of the United States, and outside of our United States Department of Justice system, Essilor now nearly completely dominates the Australian wholesale optical lens market today, for example. Essilor uses aggressive tactics to gain market share with coupons for "free" product, free anti-reflective coatings, and more, for which independently owned companies cannot compete. Add "buying up" other wholesale optical laboratories, Essilor has near total domination in the United States today. Essilor continues to purchase companies in the United States nearly every month. These purchases are more often purchases of 80% of the company stock with a "buy-out" later on (sometimes in two years), if the "sales of the business are maintained". And if you wish to really know the "real" numbers of wholesale optical laboratories that Essilor actually purchases, the companies purchased, and for how much, we suggest you subpeona the records of HPC Puckett & Company: Thomas F. Puckett Managing Director PO Box 9063 Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067 858-756-4915 Office 858-204-8777 They also have a Topeka Office: Jason A. Meyer Managing Director 5835 SW 29th Street Suite 203 Topeka, KS 66614 785-273-0017 Office 785-845-7550 Mobile HPC Puckett & Company advertise "We continue to serve the Optical and Communications Industries in completing over $7.0 Billion in transactions for our clients." The FTC is "asleep at the wheel" in regards to Essilor, overall. It appears the FTC thinks that the total domination of the wholesale optical business in the United States today by three companies is enough competition for Essilor, with Essilor being one of the three. The general public is not aware how they are effected, only that their glasses come "from somewhere else." Essentially, Essilor can do what it wants, any time, any place. The largest wholesale optical business in the United States today is Essilor, a French company. It is also the largest on Earth. The second and third players in the United States today are Zeiss and Hoya. German and Japanese ownership, respectively. Don't overlook Vision Service Plan either. VSP is now using "mergers and acquisitions" in the same way as Essilor. Using history as your guide, we suggest you look up Bausch and Lomb, and American Optical. These companies are your guide as to what happened a few decades ago, and what to do about it. The FTC came in and "fixed" the problem of "domination". You can do the same today. It is time for the FTC to come in and "fix" the problem of domination of the wholesale optical lens manufacturing business again, only the current company name now, is Essilor. Respectfully submitted.

 

 

 

 


 Essilor acquires Signet Armorlite, exclusive manufacturer of KODAK Lenses

Charenton-le-Pont, France (April 2, 2010 – 6:30 a.m. CET) – Following approval by the US competition authorities, Essilor has completed its acquisition of Signet Armorlite, a leading independent manufacturer of ophthalmic lenses. Based in California, Signet Armorlite, Inc. generates a global revenue of approximately $115 million, primarily through its subsidiaries in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Columbia, Portugal and Holland. 

Holding an exclusive worldwide license for the development, production and distribution of Kodak® brand lenses, Signet Armorlite markets a product portfolio that is strategically aligned with Essilor’s offering. The acquisition will enable Essilor to strengthen its positions in the high-quality mid-range segment. Operated independently by the current management team, Signet Armorlite will leverage Essilor’s distribution network to promote the Kodak® brand and reach new customers and consumers around the world.

 

“The acquisition of Signet Armorlite illustrates Essilor’s strategy of offering product and service lineups tailored to each segment of the ophthalmic optics market,” said Hubert Sagnières, Chief Executive Officer of Essilor International. “We’re going to capitalize on our Company’s size as well as its extensive research and development capabilities to increase the opportunities for the Kodak brand in the international ophthalmic marketplace.”  

“We see excellent synergies between the strength of our Kodak brand and Essilor’s leading position in the worldwide ophthalmic market,” said Brad Kruchten, president of Kodak’s Film, Photofinishing and Entertainment Group. “We are confident that this combination will insure the Kodak brand has a substantial position in vision care moving forward.”

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

Essilor of America Launches MyOnlineOptical.com

 

 

Following a Successful Beta Test, Essilor to Provide E-Commerce Solution for All ECPs

 

 

DALLAS – (March 26, 2010) – Essilor of America, Inc., the nation’s leading manufacturer of optical lenses, today announces the launch of its MyOnlineOptical.com e-commerce solution for independent eyecare professionals (ECPs). Following a successful Beta test with a limited number of ECPs, in partnership with FramesDirect.com, Essilor has expanded the availability of the offering which enables ECPs to provide optical products online to their current and future patients. In order to secure the technology and deploy this industry-leading solution to all ECPs, Essilor has acquired a majority stake in FramesDirect.com.

“E-commerce is rapidly emerging in our industry as more consumers enjoy the convenience of online purchasing,” said John Carrier, president, Essilor of America. “However, a solution including the ECP did not exist and our research indicated that most ECPs felt ill-equipped to compete. As long time industry partners, Essilor felt responsible to provide our customers with a solution to meet this challenge.”

“Eyeglass e-commerce is undeniably becoming a reality in today’s ophthalmic industry worldwide,” said Randolph E. Brooks, O.D., American Optometric Association (AOA) president. “We’ve received positive feedback from the Beta test and believe that MyOnlineOptical.com will provide optometrists with an opportunity to compete with online entities by offering additional visual correction solutions, and therefore increase patient retention and promote healthy practice growth.”

Essilor’s MyOnlineOptical.com allows ECPs to add a turnkey e-commerce engine that extends their reach beyond office walls and office hours to 24/7 accessibility. ECPs maintain complete control, determining the product pricing and selection, and preserving the look and feel of their practice Web sites. ECPs can provide patients with up to 100,000 eyeglass options, and keep them from walking out the door to a competitive offering. The MyOnlineOptical.com solution will allow ECPs to offer patients a secure, convenient and robust online purchasing tool for eyewear, while saving on staff time and inventory.

MyOnlineOptical.com has given me a valuable tool to compete in the online global marketplace,” said Kim Castleberry, OD. “My patients like the selection and convenience of purchasing products online and my practice bottom line is enhanced. Moreover, it has not increased my overhead. I’m not sure what the future holds for online optical sales, but I do know I have a tool to compete, thanks to Essilor.”

For more information, go to www.MyOnlineOptical.com. Any comments or questions about this Internet initiative should be addressed to MyOnlineOptical@essilorusa.com.

 

 

 

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Copyright: Chris Ryser:  April 15, 2010

 


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