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NOUVEAU VISION, INC., on behalf of itself )
vs TRANSITIONS OPTICAL, INC., ESSILOR ) OF
AMERICA, INC., and ESSILOR ) LABORATORIES OF AMERICA, INC., ) and all others
similarly situated, )
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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Case 2:1 0 -cv-00547-JCC
Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010 Page 1 of 26
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
NOUVEAU VISION, INC., on behalf of itself )
and all others similarly situated, )
) No.
Plaintiff, )
)
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
- )
)
TRANSITIONS OPTICAL, INC., ESSILOR ) JURY TRIAL
DEMANDED
OF AMERICA, INC., and ESSILOR )
LABORATORIES OF AMERICA, INC., )
)
Defendants. )
--------------------------~)
Nouveau Vision, Inc. ("Plaintiff '),
on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated,
brings this action under the federal antitrust laws, Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
15 US.C. §§ 1,2. The allegations herein are made on
information and belief, except those as to
Plaintiff, which are made on personal knowledge.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This action arises out of Defendants' and their eo-conspirators'
longstanding
conspiracy to monopolize the market for the
development ,
manufacture and sale of
photochromic
treatments for corrective ophthalmic lenses. Corrective ophthalmic lenses are
used in eyeglasses
to correct vision defects.
Consumers of corrective ophthalmic lenses may
purchase those lenses with a photo chromic treatment
to protect their eyes from ultraviolet
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 1
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL u.
38TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEA'I'I 'LE,
WASHINGTON
98104
( 206)
622-2000
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010 Page 2 of 26
1 ("VV") light, which is found in sunlight. Lenses
with photochromic treatments ("photochromic
2 lenses") darken when exposed to UV light, and fade
to clear when removed from DV light.
3
2.
Beginning no later than 1999 and continuing through
early March of 2010, and
4
perhaps thereafter, Defendants and their eo-conspirators engaged
in unfair methods of
5
competition that foreclosed key distribution channels for existing rivals and
impeded market
6 entry by potential rivals into the market for photo
chromic treatments. Defendants and their co-
7 conspirators engaged in acts and practices that
collectively had the effect of improperly
8 maintaining Transitions' monopoly power and
unreasonably restraining trade in that market.
9
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
10
3.
The claims set forth in this Complaint arise under
Section 2 of the Sherman
11 Antitrust Act (15 V.S.C.
§ 2). Plaintiff seeks treble damages pursuant to Section
4 of the
12 Clayton Act (15 U.S.c. § 15(a)).
13
4.
The jurisdiction of this Court is founded on Sections
4 and 12 and of the Clayton
14 Act (15 V.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 22), and on 28 V.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1337.
15
5.
Venue is proper in this District pursuant to Sections
4 and 12 of the Clayton
Act
16 (15 U.S.c. §§ 15(a) and 22) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
and (c) in that Defendants are located in,
17 licensed to do business in and/or do business in
this District, and a substantial part of the events
18 or occurrences giving rise to the claims alleged
occurred in this District.
19 PARTIES
20
6.
Plaintiff Nouveau Vision, Inc., is a corporation
organized under the laws of the
21 state of Washington, with its principal place of
business in Redmond Washington. During the
22 Class Period, Plaintiff purchased photo chromic
lenses directly from Defendant Essilor of
23 America, Inc.
24
7.
Defendant Transitions Optical, Inc. ("Transitions"),
is a Delaware corporation
25 with its principal place of business in Pinellas
Park, Florida. Transitions is ajoint venture
26 between PPG Industries Inc. ("PPG"), which owns 51
percent of Transitions, and Essilor
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 2
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL UoP
88TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622·2000
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 3 of 26
1 International SA ("Essilor International"), the
parent company of defendant Essilor of America,
2 Inc., which owns 49 percent of Transitions.
Transitions is the nation's largest manufacturer and
3 seller of photochromic treatments, accounting for at
least 80 percent of all such sales during the
4 last five years, and more than 85 percent of such
sales in 2008.
5
8.
Defendant Essilor of America, Inc. ("Essilor of
America"), is a Delaware
6 corporation with its principal place of business in
Dallas, Texas. EssiIor of America is a wholly-
7 owned subsidiary ofEssilor International, a 'French
corporation that is one of the world's largest
8 lens manufacturers. Essilor of America sells more
lenses than any other manufacturer in the
9 United States. In recent years, Essilor
International has consolidated and expanded its interests
10 in the United States.
11
9.
Defendant EssiIor Laboratories of America, Inc. ("Essilor
Labs"), is a North
12 Carolina corporation with its principal place of
business in Dallas, Texas. Essilor of America
13 and/or Essilor Labs own majority shares in numerous
laboratories that sell photo chromic lenses
14 at the wholesale level throughout the United
States, including one Jorgenson Optical Supply
15 Company in this district. Essilor of America and
Essilor Labs are collectively referred to as the
16 EssiIor Defendants.
17
10.
In 2008, Essilor International's worldwide revenues
were $3 billion, with 41.3
18 percent (approximately $1.27 billion) of those
revenues generated in the United States, through
19
its United States interests, including Defendants and their eo-conspirators.
20 CO-CONSPIRATORS
21
11.
Co-conspirators John Does 1-150 ("John Doe
Co-Conspirators") are laboratories
22 that sell Transitions photo chromic lenses at the
wholesale level and, to the extent that is relevant
23 to this case, are controlled by the Essilor
Defendants. See Ex. A (Essilor 2008 Registration
24 Document), at 139-40. Plaintiff cannot determine
the identities of all of those laboratories from
25 records that are available to the general public,
but anticipates doing so pursuant to discovery in
26 this action.
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 3
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL •.•. ,
38TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 4 of 26
1
2
12 .
INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE
Throughout the Class Period ,
Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators
3 manufactured, produced ,
sold and/or shipped substantial quantities of Transitions
lenses in a
4 continuous and uninterrupted flow of transactions in
interstate commerce throughout the United
5 States, including within this District. Defendants '
unlawful activities that are
the subject of this
6 Complaint were within the flow of, and have had a
direct and substantial effect on, interstate
7 trade and commerce.
8 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
9 Distribution of Eyeglass Lenses
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
13.
America.
14 .
15.
The distribution of ophthalmic lenses generally
includes three
stages. Lens
Essilor of America is the dominant lens caster in the
United States , and
owns at
Lens casters sell lenses to wholesale prescription
optical laboratories
18
("Prescription Labs"). Prescription Labs grind lenses
according to prescriptions from eye-care
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
16.
Certain Prescription Labs are owned by, controlled by
or otherwise integrated
C LASS ACTION COMPLAINT -
4
BYRNES·KELLER·CROMWELL~
38TH
FLOOR
1 000 SECOND
AVENUE
SEATTLE .
WASHINGTON
98104
(206) 622-2000
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 5 of 26
1 optician services) services. Yet other Prescription
Labs, including Plaintiff, operate independent
2 of any lens caster or retailer.
3
17.
During the period relevant to this Complaint, Essilor
Labs has owned numerous
4 Prescription Labs throughout the United States, and
acquired complete or majority ownership in
5 at least 30 Prescription Labs between 2006 and 2008.
6
18.
Photochromic lens suppliers, such as Transitions, use
Prescription Labs and their
7 sales forces to market their lenses because
Prescription Labs are the most efficient means to
8 communicate with the tens of thousands of
independent eye-care practitioners who prescribe
9 photo chromic lenses.
10
11
12
19.
20.
Eye-care practitioners and retail chains sell finished
eyeglasses to consumers.
Photochromic Lenses
Transitions treats ophthalmic lenses with photochromic
treatments. Transitions
13 deals directly with lens casters only, as dealing
with Prescription Labs or retailers would be
14 inefficient. Lens casters provide Transitions with
untreated lenses, to which Transitions applies
15 photo chromic materials.
16
21.
Transitions sells photo chromic lenses back to the
lens casters from whom it
17 received them, after which they are distributed via
the above-referenced distribution chain.
18 Transitions' Exclusionary Practices at the Lens
Caster Level
19
22.
During the period relevant to this Complaint,
Transitions, through exclusive
20 dealing arrangements with lens casters, including
written agreements, foreclosed its competitors
21 from dealing with those lens casters, which
collectively accounted for over 80 percent of
22 photo chromic lens sales in the United States.
23
23.
Transitions maintained its dominance by exclusionary
policies at nearly every
24 level of the photo chromic lens distribution chain.
25
24.
At the lens caster level - the only effective
distribution channel for photochromic
26 treatments - Transitions' anti competitive polices
included , but were
not limited to: (1) adopting
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 5
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL
•.•.
,
S8THFLOOR
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEATTLE. WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000
Case 2: 1 O-cv-00547 -JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 6 of 26
1 and announcing a general policy that it would not
deal with lens casters that sold or promoted
2 any competing photo chromic lens; (2) exclusive
agreements with certain lens casters, including
3 Essilor
of America; (3) threatening to terminate its dealings with lens casters that
would not sell
4 Transitions' lenses on an exclusive basis; and (4)
terminating a lens caster that developed a
5 competing photo chromic treatment.
6
25.
Transitions made its intentions clear in 1999, when a
rival, Coming Inc.
7 ("Corning") introduced a competitive photochromic
lens product, SunSensors. Transitions
8 responded to the competitive threat by terminating
the first lens caster to sell SunSensors lenses,
9 Signet Armorlite, Inc. 1
("Signet").
10
26.
Transitions thereafter refused to deal with any lens
caster that sold or promoted a
11 competing photochromic lens. Transitions enforced
that exclusionary policy by, among other
12 things, entering into agreements with certain lens
casters that expressly require exclusivity, and
13 by publicizing its exclusive dealing policy in the
marketplace.
14
27.
For example, in 2005 when lens caster Vision-Ease Lens
("Vision-Ease")
15 introduced its own brand of photo chromic lenses,
LifeRx, Transitions refused to deal with
16 Vision-Ease. Vision-Ease was able to keep its
LifeRx product on the market only by entering
17 into secret negotiations with one of the largest
optical retailers in the United States, who
18 committed to providing Vision-Ease with enough
business to replace its lost Transitions sales.
19
28.
Transitions' exclusionary policies at the lens caster
level effectively precluded
20 even those lens casters that have not signed
exclusivity agreements with Transitions from dealing
21 with Transitions' competitors, as those lens
casters were aware of Transitions' policy.
22
29.
Because of Transitions' dominant market position and
its exclusivity demands,
23 lens casters were faced with: (1) losing
Transitions' business, which accounted for at least 40
24 percent of most lens casters' revenues, or (2)
endangering their sales of clear lenses, as many
25
26
1 Consistent with Defendants'
general practice, Essilor International permanently removed
Signet as a competitive threat recently, when EOA Holding Co., Inc., a
wholly-owned subsidiary
ofEssilor International, purchased Signet. See Ex. B (Essilor press
release, Jan. 15,2009).
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 6
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL
LLP
38TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEA'ITLE, WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 7 of 26
1 retailers and Prescription Labs prefer to buy both
clear and photo chromic versions of the same
2 lenses. Losing the ability to sell Transitions
lenses to those Prescription Labs and retailers -
3 many of whom have their own exclusivity agreement
with Transitions - would deprive any
4 affected lens caster of substantial numbers of
potential customers.
5
30.
Lens casters that are exclusive to Transitions
collectively account for over 85
6 percent of photo chromic lens sales in the United
States :
7
31.
Through its contracts and policies, Transitions has
deprived Coming and other
8 rival and potential rival photo chromic treatment
suppliers of the most effective distribution
9 channel-lens casters - thereby removing them as a
competitive threat to Transitions' monopoly
10 and effectively deterring such firms from investing
in research and development to improve the
11
photochromic products on the market today.
12
32.
Lens casters who might have otherwise developed their
own photochromic
13 treatments have learned from the Vision-Ease
experience that they cannot do so absent a
14 commitment from a large
optical retailer to carry the resulting products. Since Transitions
15 terminated Vision-Ease for introducing LifeRx in
2005, no other lens caster has introduced a
16 new line of photo chromic lenses in the United
States.
17 Transitions' Exclusionary
Practices at the Prescription Lab Level
18
33.
At least half of all Prescription Labs in the United
States - including labs owned
19 by the Essilor Defendants - are owned by lens
casters that sell only Transitions' photo chromic
20 lenses, thereby substantially eliminating access to
those labs for rival photo chromic treatment
21 suppliers.
22
34 .
So as to limit its competitors' access to independent
Prescription Labs as a
23 distribution channel, Transitions has entered into
agreements with over 100 Prescription Labs,
24 including 23 of the 30 largest independent
Prescription Labs, requiring that those Prescription
25 Labs
sell Transitions' lenses as their preferred photochromic lens, and minimize
their promotion
26 of competing photo chromic lenses .
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 7
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL ~.
88TH FLoOR
1000 SECOND
AVENUE
SEA'ITLE. WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 8 of 26
35. Transitions' exc1usionary Prescription Lab
agreements, combined with its
2 agreements with lens casters that own over half of
the Prescription Labs in the United States,
3 minimize the ability of Transitions' rivals to
promote and sell their photochromic lenses to
4 independent eye-care practitioners
(i.e., practitioners unaffiliated with retail chains).
5 Transitions' Exclusionary Practices at the Optical
Retailer Level
6
36.
Transitions also directed its exclusionary practices
at Prescription Labs and
7 optical retailers via: (1) long-term exclusionary
agreements with most major retailers; (2)
8 agreements with Prescription Labs requiring that
they promote Transitions' lenses as their
9 preferred photo chromic lens and strictly limit
their sales efforts for competing photochromic
10 lenses; and (3) offering discounts only to
retailers who sold extremely high percentages of
11 Transitions' photo chromic lenses, as compared to
Transitions' competitors.
12
37.
These agreements foreclosed downstream outlets for
photo chromic lenses and
13 created significant barriers to entry to rival
photo chromic treatment suppliers.
14
38.
Large optical retailers are one of the most efficient
channels of distribution for
15 photochromic lenses to consumers. After terminating
Vision-Ease for developing and selling a
16 competing photo chromic lens, Transitions entered
into exclusive contracts with over 50 optical
17 retailers ,
including many of the largest retail chains. Most of these
exclusive agreements were
18 long-term and included provisions making
termination onerous.
19
39.
Transitions' actions effectively excluded Vision-Ease,
other rivals and potential
20 rivals from an efficient distribution channel.
21
40 .
Transitions' conduct minimized the effect of Vision-Ea
se's entry into the market,
22 deterred potential competitors from attempting to
enter the market and effectively prevented
23 Vision-Ease or any other rival photo chromic
suppliers from restraining Transitions' exercise of
24 monopoly power.
25
26
. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 8
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL
u.>
38THFLOoll
1000 SECOND
AVENUE
SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON 98104
(Z06) 622-2000
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 9
of 26
1
2
41.
Transitions' Anticompetitive
Bundled Discounts
Transitions' agreements with Prescription Labs and
optical retailers generally
3 provide for discounts only to customers who purchase
all or almost all of their photochromic lens
4 needs from Transitions.
5
42.
No other photo chromic treatment supplier has a
treatment that applies to a full
6 line of ophthalmic lenses. Transitions' discount
structure thus impairs its competitors' ability to
7 compete for sales to those customers, as those
customers can neither discontinue nor limit their
8 sales of Transitions' products.
9
43.
Transitions' bundled discount arrangements erect a
significant entry barrier by
10 limiting the ability of rival photochromic
treatment suppliers to enter the market with new
11 photo chromic treatments suitable for anything less
than a full line of lenses. Those arrangements
12 also strengthen the barriers to entry erected by
Transitions' policy of requiring that lens casters
13 deal exclusively with Transitions.
14
44.
Transitions' exclusionary practices in dealing with
Prescription Labs and optical
15 retailers foreclose its rivals, in whole or in
part, from substantial shares of the photo chromic lens
16 market at those levels.
17 Essilor Defendants' Conspiracy
18
45.
At all relevant times, Essilor of America purchased
and sold no photochromic
19 lenses other than Transitions' photochromic lenses.
However, unlike other lens casters that
20 entered into exclusive agreements with Transitions,
Essilor of America did so in whole or in
21 substantial part to bolster Transitions' monopoly
in the relevant market.
22
46.
Essilor of America also entered into exclusive
agreements with multiple
23 Prescription Labs and optical retailers, which
required those purchasers to sell and/or actively
24 promote only Essilor lenses. A necessary result of
those agreements was to bolster Transitions'
25 monopoly in the relevant market.
26
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 9
BYRNES +
KELLER • CROMWELL ~
38TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND AVENU E
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622.2000
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 10 of 26
1
47.
At all relevant times after their purchase by one or
more of the Essilor
2 Defendants, the John Doe Cc-Conspirators purchased
and sold Transitions photochromic lenses
3 on a substantially exclusive basis. However, unlike
other Prescription Labs that entered into
4 exclusive agreements with Transitions, the John Doe
Co-Conspirators did so in whole or in
5 substantial part to bolster Transitions' monopoly in
the relevant market.
6 FTC Action Against Transitions
7
48.
On March 3, 2010, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
accepted for public
8 comment an Agreement Containing Consent Order to
Cease and Desist with Transitions.
9
49.
The FTC concurrently released a proposed complaint
against Transitions (the
10 "FTC Complaint") and the Decision and Order (the
"Order") that resulted from its investigation .
11
12
50.
(a)
a relevant market for the development, manufacture and
sale of
13 photochromic treatments for corrective ophthalmic
lenses (the "Photo chromic Treatment
14
15
16
17
18
|
Market"); |
|
|
(b) |
|
(c) |
|
Cd) |
|
Market; |
|
|
(e) |
there are no close substitutes for photochromic
lenses;
Transitions has monopoly power in the Photo chromic
Treatment Market;
there are significant barriers to entry into the Photochromic Treatment
20 power in the Photochromic Treatment Market; and
21
(t)
the anticompetitive effects of Transitions' conduct
include: (1) increasing
22 the prices and reducing the output of photochromic
lenses; (2) deterring, delaying and impeding
23 the ability of Transitions' actual or potential
competitors to enter or to expand their sales in the
24 Photo chromic Treatment Market; (3) reducing
innovation; and (4) reducing consumer choice
25 among competing photochromic lenses.
26
51.
Among other things, the Order:
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 10
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL u.
38TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND
AVENUE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 11 of 26
1
(a)
prohibits Transitions from entering into any
agreements or adopting any
2 policies that limit its customers' ability to buy or
sell competing photo chromic treatments ,
or that
3 require customers to give Transitions' products
preferential treatment as compared to its
4 competitors' products;
5
(b)
prohibits Transitions from entering into exclusive
agreements relating to
6 photo chromic lenses, or a number of related
products and services;
7
(c)
prohibits Transitions from offering discounts that are
based on the degree
8 to which its customers sell Transitions'
photochromic lenses as compared to its competitors;
9
(d)
prohibits Transitions from offering discounts that are
applied retroactively
10 after a customer's sales reach a specific
threshold; and
11
(e)
prohibits Transitions from bundling discounts such
that customers
12 purchasing more than one line of photo chromic
lenses obtain additional discounts.
13 RELEVANT MARKET
14
52.
The relevant market is the development, manufacture
and sale of photochromic
15 treatments for corrective ophthalmic lenses in the
United States - the Photo chromic Treatment
16 Market.
17
53.
Photo chromic lenses have characteristics and uses
distinct from those of clear
18 corrective ophthalmic lenses ,
polarized lenses (which are designed to remove glare),
and fixed-
19 tint lenses (prescription sunglasses).
20
54.
There are no close substitutes for photochromic
lenses, and no other product
21 significantly constrains the prices of photochromic
lenses.
22
55.
In 2008, photo chromic lenses represented
approximately 19 percent of all
23 corrective ophthalmic lenses sold in the United
States, totaling approximately $630 million in
24 sales at the wholesale level.
25
26
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 11
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL u.P
38TH FLOOl!
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON
98104
(206) 622-2000
Case 2 :1
0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 12 of 26
. .
,
TRANSITIONS HOLDS MONOPOLY POWER IN THE
RELEVANT MARKET
2
56.
Transitions possesses monopoly power in the relevant
market. Transitions'share
3 of the relevant market has been at least 80 percent
during each of the past five years. In 2008,
4 Transitions' market share was over 85 percent.
5
57.
Significant and lasting barriers make entry into the
relevant market difficult.
6 These barriers include, but are not limited to: (i)
product development costs; (ii) capital
7 requirements; (iii) intellectual property
rights; (iv) regulatory requirements; and (v) Transitions '
8 unfair methods of competition.
9
58.
Transitions' monopoly power is also reflected by its
ability to exclude
10
competitors and to control prices. The indicia of Transitions'
monopoly power include, but are
11 not
limited to, Transitions' ability to: (i) coerce lens casters to accept exclusive
dealing
12 arrangements; (ii) price its products without
regard to its competitors' prices; (iii) impose
13
significant price increases; and (iv) withhold a desired product - a low-priced,
private label
14 photochromic
lens - from consumers in the United States, even though Transitions supplies it
in
15 other
markets.
16 CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
59.
60.
Plaintiff brings this action as
a class action pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil
All persons or entities that purchased Transitions
lenses directly
from Defendants or any of the John Doe Co-Conspirators at any
time during the four years preceding the date of this Complaint
(the "Class Period"). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and
their subsidiaries, parents, or affiliates, Defendants' eo-
conspirators, whether or not named as a Defendant in this
Complaint , and
government entities.
The Class is individually so numerous that joinder of
all members is
26 impracticable .
While the exact number of members of the Class is unknown
to Plaintiff at this
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 12
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL
u..
38THFLOOll
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEATTLE, W ASHINGTON
98104
(206) 622-2000
|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14 |
|
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
|
|
Filed
03/30/2010
Page 13 of 26 |
|
15 Class and has retained counsel competent and
experienced in class action and antitrust
litigation. |
|
time, based on the nature of the trade and commerce
involved, Plaintiff reasonably believes that
|
|
there are at least hundreds of members in the Class
and that their identities can be learned from
|
|
records in Defendants' possession, custody or
control. Class members are geographically
|
|
dispersed throughout the United States. |
|
Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the
other members ofthe Class. |
|
Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all
sustained damage in that during the Class Period
|
|
they purchased Transitions lenses directly from a
Defendant or a John Doe Co-Conspirator at
|
|
artificially maintained, non-competitive prices,
established by the Defendants' actions in
|
|
connection with the anticompetitive behavior alleged
herein. Defendants' anticompetitive |
|
conduct,
the effects of such violations, and the relief
sought are all issues or questions that are
|
|
common to Plaintiff and the other Class members.
|
|
Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the members of the |
|
Hi Plaintiff's interests are coincident with,
and not antagonistic to, the interests of the other
Class
17 members. |
|
63.
.
Common questions of law and fact exist as to all
members of the Class and |
|
predominate over any questions affecting solely
individual members of the Class. |
|
The common questions of law and fact common to the
Class include, but are not |
|
whether the development, manufacture and sale of
photochromic
treatments for corrective ophthalmic lenses in the
United States (the
"Photo chromic Treatment Market") is the relevant
market in this case; |
|
whether Transitions possesses monopoly power in the
Photochromic
Treatment Market; |
|
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 13 |
|
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL
u>
S8THFLOOR
1000 SECONDAVENtJE
SEATTLE. W.\SHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000 |
|
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 |
|
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
|
|
Filed
03/30/2010
Page 14 of 26 |
|
whether, through the conduct alleged herein,
Transitions willfully
acquired, maintained and enhanced its monopoly power
in the
Photochromic Treatment Market; |
|
whether, through the conduct alleged herein,
Defendants and the John Doe
Co-Conspirators conspired to confer, maintain or
enhance Transitions'
monopoly power in the Photo chromic Treatment
Market; |
|
whether Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators
conspired to
engage in unlawful exclusionary conduct to impair
the opportunities of
Transitions' rivals in the Photo chromic Treatment
Market; |
|
whether Transitions entered into exclusionary
agreements that
unreasonably restrained trade and impaired its
rivals in the Photo chromic
Treatment Market; |
|
whether Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators
engaged in a
contract, combination or conspiracy among themselves
to unreasonably
restrain trade and impair Transitions' rivals in the
Photochromic
Treatment Market; |
|
whether and to what extent, Defendants' and the John
Doe Co-
Conspirators' conduct caused Class members to pay
supra-competitive
prices and, thereby, suffer antitrust injuries; and
|
|
whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to
any damages and, if
so, the appropriate Class-wide measure of damages.
|
|
A class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient |
|
adjudication of this controversy because joinder of
all members of the Class is impracticable.
|
|
The prosecution of separate actions by individual
members of the Class would impose heavy |
|
burdens upon the courts and Defendants, and would
create a risk of inconsistent or varying
|
|
adjudications of the questions oflaw and fact common
to the Class. A class action would |
|
achieve substantial economies of time, effort and
expense, and would assure uniformity of |
|
decision as to persons similarly situated without
sacrificing procedural fairness. There will be no
|
|
material difficulty in the management of this action
as a class action on behalf of the Class.
|
|
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 14 |
|
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL
~
88TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEATTLE. WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000 |
|
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1 |
|
Filed
03/30/2010
Page 15 of 26 |
|
COUNT I
Violation of Section 2 ofthe Sherman Antitrust Act,
15 V.S.C. § 2: Monopolization
Against Defendant Transitions Only
66.
Plaintiff
incorporates by reference the preceding allegations.
|
|
Transitions acquired, willfully maintained and
unlawfully exercised monopoly |
|
power in the relevant market through the
exclusionary,
anticompetitive conduct set forth above,
|
|
including, but not limited to: |
|
at the lens caster level: (1) adopting and publicly
announcing a general |
|
policy of refusing to deal with lens casters that
sell or promote any competing photo chromic
|
|
lens; (2) entering into exclusive agreements with
certain lens casters;
(3)
threatening to terminate
|
|
lens casters that would not sell Transitions' lenses
on an exclusive basis; and (4) terminating a
|
|
lens caster that developed a competing photo chromic
treatment; and |
|
at the Prescription Lab and optical retailer levels:
(1) entering into long- |
|
term exclusionary
agreements with most major optical retailers; (2)
entering into agreements
|
|
with Prescription Labs requiring that they promote
Transitions'
lenses as their preferred |
|
photo chromic lens and withhold normal sales efforts
for competing photo chromic lenses;
and (3) |
|
offering discounts only to customers who sold only
or almost only Transitions' photochromic
|
|
There is
no legitimate business justification for
Transitions' actions and the |
|
23 conduct through which it maintained
'its
monopoly power in the relevant market. |
|
Transitions has effectively
excluded competition from the relevant
market, |
|
maintained its dominant market share in the relevant
market, and profited from its |
|
anticompetitive conduct by excluding less expensive,
superior competitive products, by |
|
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT -15 |
|
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL
wo
88'1'HFLOOR
1000
SECOND
AVENUE
SEATTLE.
WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000
|
|
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14 |
|
Case 2:10-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
|
|
Filed
03/30/2010
Page 16 of 26 |
|
maintaining prices at artificially high levels, and
by reaping the benefits of its illegally obtained
|
|
and maintained monopoly power. |
|
The anticompetitive effects of Transitions' conduct
far outweigh any conceivable |
|
procompetitive benefits or justifications.
|
|
Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured
in their business or property |
|
by Transitions' monopolization of the relevant
market. Without limiting the generality of the
|
|
foregoing, Plaintiff and the other members of the
Class have been forced to pay higher prices for
|
|
photo chromic lenses, including Transitions lenses,
than they would have paid absent Transitions'
|
|
COUNTll
Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
15 D.S.C.
§
2:
Conspiracy to Monopolize
Against All Defendants
Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding
allegations. |
|
As set forth above, the Essilor Defendants actively
facilitated Transitions' efforts |
|
17 to acquire, willfully maintain and
unlawfully exercise monopoly power in the relevant
market
18 through the excIusionary, anti competitive
conduct set forth above, including, but not limited
to: |
|
purchasing and selling only Transitions' photo
chromic lenses; |
|
exercising their control over the John Doe
Co-Conspirators to induce them |
|
to substantially limit their purchases and sales of
photo chromic lenses to Transitions |
|
photo chromic lenses; and |
|
in the case of Essilor of America,
entering into agreements that effectively
|
|
25 induced its Prescription Lab customers
(other than the
JOM
Doe Co-Conspirators) to purchase |
|
26 and sell only Transitions' photo chromic
lenses. |
|
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 16 |
|
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL
U.P
38TH FLOOI!
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000 |
|
Filed
03/30/2010
Page 17 of 26 |
|
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
|
|
Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators sought
to obtain, maintain and |
|
enhance Transitions' monopoly power in the Photo
chromic Treatments Market beginning no |
|
later than 1999 when Transitions began implementing
exclusionary contracts with lens casters,
|
|
including Essilor of America, to thwart competition
from Corning and other potential rivals.
|
|
Pursuant to their anti-competitive conspiracy, the
Essilor Defendants agreed to |
|
enter into anticompetitive exclusionary agreements,
with Transitions, with each other, with the
|
|
John Doe Co-Conspirators, and with their respective
non-conspiring customers, that effectively
|
|
blocked rival photochromic treatment suppliers from
contracting with the Essilor Defendants and
|
|
prevented those rivals from distributing through the
John Doe Co-Conspirators. |
|
76. Each
of the Defendants and the John Doe Co-Conspirators
has committed at least |
|
one overt act - such as entering into exclusionary
agreements and selling Transitions lenses at
|
|
supra-competitive prices - to further the
conspiracy. |
|
Each of the Defendants and the John Doe
Co-Conspirators intended that the |
|
conspiracy to monopolize alleged herein would
maintain and enhance Transitions' monopoly
|
|
power and injure Plaintiff and the Class thereby.
|
|
Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured
in their business or property |
|
by Defendants' antitrust violations. The injury to
Plaintiff and the Class consists of paying
|
|
artificially inflated prices for photo chromic
lenses, including Transitions lenses. Such injury,
in |
|
the form of overcharges, is the type of injury the
antitrust laws were designed to prevent and
|
|
flows directly from Defendants' unlawful conduct.
|
|
ANTI COMPETITIVE
EFFECTS OF DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT |
|
The effects of Defendants' anticompetitive
exclusionary acts have been to capture |
|
and/or maintain for Transitions more than 80 percent
of the relevant market, to substantially
|
|
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 17 |
|
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL ....,.
38TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND
AVENUE
SEATTLE.
WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000
|
|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 |
|
Case 2:1 O-cv-00547-JCC Document 1 |
|
Filed
03/30/2010
Page
·18
of 26 |
|
impair and foreclose competition from Transitions'
rivals in the Photochromic Treatment |
|
Market, and to significantly raise barriers to entry
for potential rivals. |
|
Defendants' conduct adversely affects competition
and consumers by (1) |
|
increasing the prices and reducing the output of
photo chromic lenses; (2) deterring, delaying and
|
|
impeding the ability of Transitions' actual or
potential competitors to enter or to expand their
|
|
sales in the Photo chromic Treatment Market; (3)
reducing innovation; and (4) reducing |
|
consumer choice among competing photochromic lenses.
|
|
Absent Defendants' conduct and the substantial
foreclosure and impairment of |
|
effective competition caused by such conduct,
Transitions, as a rational actor, would have
|
|
reduced the price it charged to lens casters for its
photo chromic treatment of lenses and/or
|
|
supplied its low-priced, private label photochromic
lens (which it offers outside of the United
|
|
States where it faces increased competition) in
response to added unimpaired competition from
|
|
Coming, Vision-Ease and other rivals and potential
rivals
(i.
e.,
Prescription Labs and/or lens |
|
casters that could have or would have developed
their own photo chromic treatments). Moreover,
|
|
had actual or potential photo chromic treatment
suppliers not been substantially foreclosed or
|
|
stifled by Defendants' anti competitive conduct from
effectively competing in the market for such
|
|
products, those competitors and/or potential
competitors would have sold much more of their
|
|
products, gained a larger market share and achieved
economies of scale and scope that could |
|
have further driven down prices in the marketplace.
|
|
By unlawfully excluding and impairing competition,
Defendants' conduct has |
|
caused Plaintiff and other Class members to pay more
for photo chromic lenses than they |
|
otherwise would have paid absent Transitions'
illegal, exc1usionary conduct. |
|
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 18 |
|
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL
~
38TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000 |
|
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 |
|
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
|
|
Filed
03/30/2010
Page 19 of 26 |
|
As a result of Defendants' illegal conduct, members
of the Class were compelled |
|
to pay, and did pay, artificially inflated prices
for the Transitions lenses they purchased. Had
|
|
potential competitors been able to enter the market
unirnpeded by Defendants' illegal conduct (or
|
|
been a threat to enter the market), Plaintiff and
other members of the Class would have been able
|
|
to, inter alia, purchase less expensive photo
chromic lenses. The prices that Plaintiff and other
|
|
Class members paid for photo chromic lenses during
the Class Period were substantially greater
|
|
than the prices they would have paid absent the
illegal exc1usionary conduct alleged herein
|
|
because: (a) the prices of all photo chromic lenses
were artificially inflated by Transitions' illegal
|
|
conduct - as competitors were deprived of economies
of scale and efficient distribution channels
|
|
_ and (b) Class members were deprived of the
opportunity to purchase competing photochromic
|
|
lenses and to purchase those lenses at lower prices.
Members of the Class have, as a |
|
consequence, sustained losses and damage to their
business and property in the form of |
|
overcharges. The full amount of such damages will be
calculated after discovery and upon proof
|
|
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the
following: |
|
Certification of the Class proposed in this
Complaint; |
|
Defendants' actions described herein be adjudged and
decreed to be in violation |
|
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
V.S.C.
§
2; |
|
Plaintiff and the Class recover damages, as provided
by law, that they are |
|
determined to have sustained, and that judgment in
favor of plaintiff be entered |
|
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 19 |
|
BYRNES.KELLER·CROMWELL~
88TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND AVENUE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622-2000 |
Case 2:1 0-cv-00547-JCC Document 1
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 20 of 26
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
D.
E.
Plaintiff and the Class recover their costs of this
suit, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, as provided by law; and
Plaintiff and the Class be granted such other, further
and different relief as the
nature of the case may require or as may seem just and
proper to this Court .
By
Isl Paul R. Taylor
Paul R. Taylor, WSBA
#14851
Bymes Keller Cromwell LLP
1000 Second Avenue, 38th
Floor
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 622-2000
Fax: (206) 622-2522
ptaylor@byrneskeller.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class
Of counsel:
BERGER
&
MONTAGUE, P.C.
H. Laddie Montague, Jr.
Merrill G. Davidoff
Bart D. Cohen
Andrew C. Curley
1622 Locust Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 875-3000
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 20
BYRNES • KELLER • CROMWELL
wo
38TH FLOOR
1000 SECOND
AVENUE
S EATI'LE.
WASHINGTON 98104
(206) 622.2000
Case 2 :10-cv-00547-JCC
Document 1 Filed
03/30/2010 Page 21 of 26
EXHIBIT A

|
Case 2:10-cv-00547-JCC |
Document 1 |
Filed
03/30/2010 |
Page 23 of 26
|
|
FINANCIAL INFORMATION CONCERNING ASSETS AND
UABILITIES, FINANCIAL rosmos
AND PROFITS AND LOSSES |
20 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008 Conso udated
financial
statements
|
|
N OTE
32.
|
LIST OF FULLY-CONSOLIDATED COMPANIES
|
•· ... •.
~" •. M.···'··
.•.
·MM_"_
... no.'~
•. " ••
M |
" H"""H"""".,~,,,M
•••
,,_"'HH'_"·"····H""'_'H_H_
|
|
|
•• ••••••••••••••
_ •••••
H."
••••••••
H ••••
"'
•••••••
,,,
••••
,,,·,,,,,,,,,
__ , •••
__ ."
••••• |
. ..
, ....
"."
....
".,."
......
"
..
" .....
|
•••• ••
_____
H •• H •••••••••••••
__
•••••
H ••••••••
_.
____
•••••••••
H ••••••
|
|
|
|
|
% |
|
|
|
|
|
% |
|
|
|
|
voting
|
% |
|
|
|
voting |
% |
|
Company |
Country
|
r ights
|
interest |
Company |
|
Country |
rights |
interest |
|
FRANCE |
|
|
|
|
Optilens Italla s .r.I.
|
Italy |
100 |
100 |
|
BBGR |
France |
100 |
100 |
Sat lsloh
Italia
|
Italy |
100 |
100 |
|
BNL Eurolens |
France
|
100 |
100 |
Ess llor
Norge A.S.
|
Norway |
100 |
100 |
|
Oelamare Sovra |
France |
100 |
100 |
Sentralslip |
|
Norway |
80 |
Ba |
|
Essldev |
France
|
100 |
100 |
Ess ilor
Nederland BV |
Netherlands |
100 |
100 |
|
Invoptic |
France
|
100 |
100 |
Ess llor
Nederland Holding BV |
Netherlands |
100 |
100 |
|
Mega Optics |
France
|
75 |
75 |
Holland Optical Corp. BV |
Netherlands |
100 |
100 |
|
Novacel |
France
|
75 |
75 |
Holland Optical Instruments BV
|
Netherlands |
74 |
74 |
|
Nov isla
|
France
|
100 |
100 |
Omax |
|
Netherlands |
51 |
51 |
|
OMI |
France
|
100 |
100 |
Essilor Optical laboratory |
|
|
|
|
Opt lm
|
France
|
100 |
100 |
Polska Sp. Z.o.o. |
Poland |
100 |
100 |
|
Satis loh
SAS |
France
|
100 |
100 |
Essilor Polonia |
Poland |
100 |
100 |
|
l1ka l
Vision
(ex Barbara) |
France
|
100 |
100 |
Esslfor Portugal |
Portugal
|
100 |
100 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ess ilor
Romania SRL |
Roman ia
|
100 |
100 |
|
EUROPE |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
100 |
Omega Slovakia |
Slovakia
|
Ba |
Ba |
|
BBGRGmbH |
Germany
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
100 |
Ess llor
0.0.0 Slovehla |
Slovenla
|
100 |
100 |
|
Ess ilor
GmbH |
Germany
|
|
|
|
|
Germany
|
7S |
7S |
Essilor AB |
|
Sweden |
100 |
100 |
|
Nlka |
|
|
|
Rupp & Hubrach Opt ik
Gmbh |
Germany |
100 .
|
100 |
BBGR Skandinavlska |
Sweden |
100 |
100 |
|
Satis loh
Gmbh |
Germany |
100
|
100 |
Ess ilor
(Sulsse) SA |
Switzerland |
100 |
100 |
|
|
|
100
|
100 |
Satisloh Holding AG |
Switzerland |
100 |
100 |
|
Essllor Austria Gmbh |
Austria |
|
|
|
Ess llor
Belgium
S.A. |
Belgium |
100
|
100 |
Sat islohAG
|
|
Switzerland |
100 |
100 |
|
|
|
|
Satisloh Photonies AG |
Switzer land
|
100 |
100 |
|
Essllor Croat la
|
Croatia |
100
|
100 |
|
|
|
Denmark |
100
|
1 00
|
Vaco Holding SA |
Switzerland |
100 |
100 |
|
Ess ilor
Danmark A.S.
|
|
|
BBGR lens Iberia S .A.
|
Spain
|
100
|
100 |
Essllor Optika Spol s .r.o.
|
Czech Rep. |
100 |
100 |
|
Essilor Espana SA |
Spain
|
100
|
100 |
Omega |
|
Czech Rep .
|
BO
|
80 |
|
Satlsloh lberica |
Spain
|
100
|
100 |
Essllor Optika 000 |
Russia |
100 |
100 |
|
Essllor QY |
Rnland |
100
|
100 |
NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
|
|
|
|
BBGR United Kingdom |
United Kingdom |
100
|
100 |
Aries Optical Ltd. |
Canada |
100 |
100 |
|
Ess llor
lid |
United Kingdom |
100
|
100 |
BBGR Optique Canada Inc .
|
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Essilor European Shared |
|
|
|
|
Canoptec Inc. |
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Service Cente r
Ud. |
United Kingdom |
100
|
100 |
CUstom Surface ltd. |
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Satlsloh Ltd |
United Kingdom |
100
|
100 |
Eastern Optica l
laboratories Ltd. |
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Slnc lalr
Optical
laboratories |
Un ited
Kingdom |
100
|
100 |
Essi lor
Canada Ltd.
|
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Un ited
Optical
La boratories |
United Kingdom |
80
|
BO |
Groupe Vision Opt ique
|
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Essllor Optika Kit |
Hungary |
100
|
100 |
K&W Optical Ltd. |
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Athlone |
Ireland |
Ba
|
80 |
Metro Optical Ltd. |
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Essllor Ireland (branch) |
Ireland
|
100
|
100 |
Morr ison
Optical |
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Ess llor
Ireland (Sales) Ltd |
Ireland
|
100 |
100 |
OK Lenscraft Laboratories Ltd.
|
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Orqanic Lens Manufactu ring
|
|
|
|
|
OPSG Ltd. |
|
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
(branch )
|
Ireland
|
100 |
100 |
Optical Software Inc |
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
ATR MEC Opt Ical
Mlfano s.r.l.
|
Italy
|
100
|
100 |
Opt ique
de l'Estrie Inc.
|
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
Esslfor Ital la
S.pA
|
Italy
|
100 |
100 |
Opt ique
Uson Inc. |
Canada
|
|
100 |
|
|
|
100 |
|
LTl S.p.A. |
Italy
|
100 |
100 |
|
|
|
|
70 |
|
|
|
Opt ique
Cristal |
Canada
|
70 |
|
Oltalmika Galileo Spa |
Italy
|
100 |
1 00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Perspectics |
|
Canada
|
100 |
100 |
|
|
|
ESSILOR -2008 Registration Document and
Annual Financial Report |
139 |
|
Case 2:1 O-cv-00547-JCC |
Document 1 |
Filed
0313012010 |
Page 24 of 26
|
|
20 |
FINANCIAL INFORMATION CONCERNING ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES, FINANCIAL PosmON AND PROFITS AND LOSSES |
|
2 008
ConsalidateC
financial
statements
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
% |
|
|
|
% |
|
|
|
|
voting |
% |
|
|
voting |
% |
|
Company |
Country |
rights |
Interest |
Company |
Country |
rights |
interest |
|
Pioneer Optical Inc. |
Canada |
100 |
100 |
Optical Suppliers Inc. (Hawa'O
|
USA
|
85 |
85 |
|
Pro Optic canada Inc. |
Canada |
100 |
100 |
Optifacts Inc. |
USA
|
100 |
100 |
|
R&R Optical Laboratory Ud. |
Canada |
100 |
100 |
Optimatnx |
USA
|
80 |
80 |
|
SOL |
canada |
90 |
90 |
Ozarks Optical Laboratories
|
USA
|
80 |
80 |
|
Westlab |
canada |
85 |
85 |
Pech Optical |
USA
|
80 |
80 |
|
21st Century Opt ics
Inc. |
USA |
80 |
80 |
Perferx Optical Co Inc |
USA
|
80 |
80 |
|
Accu Rx Inc |
USA |
80 |
80 |
Personnal Eyes |
USA
|
80 |
80 |
|
Advance Optical |
USA |
90 |
90 |
Peninsula Optical Lab. |
USA
|
80 |
80 |
|
Beitler Mc Kee Company |
USA |
90 |
90 |
Predsion Optical Lab. (Tennessee)
|
USA
|
80 |
80 |
|
Collard Rose |
USA |
80 |
80 |
Precision Optical Co. (Connecticut)
|
USA
|
80 |
80 |
|
Dependable |
USA |
80 |
80 |
Satlsloh Inc |
USA
|
100 |
100 |
|
Deschutes |
USA |
80 |
80 |
Select Optical Inc .
|
USA
|
100 |
100 |
|
Dibok Aspen Optical |
USA |
80 |
80 |
Southwest lens |
USA
|
65 |
65 |
|
Dunlaw Optical Laboratories Inc.
|
USA |
80 |
80 |
Speciality Lens Corp. |
USA
|
100 |
100 |
|
ELOA california Acquisition Corp.
|
USA |
100 |
100 |
Stereo Optical Co. Inc. |
USA
|
100 |
100 |
|
Empire |
USA |
85 |
85 |
SunStar Inc. |
USA
|
80 |
80 |
|
EOA Investment Inc. |
USA |
100 |
100 |
Sutherlln Optical Company |
USA
|
85 |
85 |
|
Essllor Latin America & |
|
|
|
Trl Supreme Optical LLC |
USA
|
100 |
100 |
|
Caribbean Inc. |
USA |
100 |
100 |
Uniscoat Inc. |
USA
|
100 |
100 |
|
Essilor Laboratories of America
|
|
|
|
ViSion-Craft Inc. |
USA |
BD
|
BO |
|
Corporation |
USA |
100 |
100 |
|
Essilor laboratories of America
|
|
|
|
Essilor Mexico |
Mexico |
100 |
100 |
|
Holding Co Inc. |
USA |
100 |
100 |
Soli de Chihuahua |
Mexico |
100 |
100 |
|
Essilor Laboratories Of America
|
|
|
|
Vis ion
Center S.A. de C.V.
|
Mexico |
100 |
100 |
|
Holding II |
USA |
100 |
100 |
Rainbow Optical |
Puerto Rico |
100 |
100 |
|
Essilor laboratories of America,
|
|
|
|
OTHER |
|
|
|
|
Inc (indus Laboratolres US)
|
USA |
100 |
100 |
|
|
|
|
Essl/or Laboratories of America,
|
|
|
|
Essl/or South Africa <pty> Ltd.
|
South Africa |
100 |
100 |
|
LP (indus Avisia, Omega, Duffens)
|
USA |
100 |
100 |
Essl/or Argentine S.A. |
Argentina |
100 |
1 00
|
|
Essllor of America Holding Co Inc.
|
USA |
100 |
100 |
AR Coating SA |
Argentina |
95
|
95 |
|
Essilor of America Inc. |
USA |
100 |
100 |
City Optical Pty Ltd. |
Australia |
100 |
100 |
|
Eye care Express Lab Inc |
USA |
80 |
80 |
Essilor Australia Pty Ltd. |
Australia |
100 |
100 |
|
Focus Optical Labs, lnc |
USA |
80 |
80 |
Ess ilor
Laboratory SOuth Australia |
|
|
|
|
Future Optics Inc |
USA |
80 |
80 |
Pty Ltd. |
Australia |
100 |
100 |
|
Gentex Optics Inc. |
USA |
100 |
100 |
Essilor Laboratories of Australia
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pty Ltd. |
Australia |
100 |
100 |
|
Homer Optica l
|
USA |
100 |
100 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Essilor Laboratory Western Australia Australia
|
100 |
100 |
|
Interstate Optical |
USA |
80 |
80 |
|
|
|
|
|
Essl/or Lens Australia pty Ltd.
|
Australia |
100 |
100 |
|
Jorgenson Optical Supply
01. |
USA |
80 |
Ba |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hobart Optical |
Australia |
100 |
100 |
|
MGM |
USA |
BD |
Ba |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Tee Optik |
Australia |
100 |
100 |
|
Midland Optical |
USA |
80 |
80 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Brasllor Partidpacoes Se Ltda.
|
Brazil |
100 |
100 |
|
Nassau Lens Co Inc. |
USA |
100 |
100 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Essllor Da Amazonia Industria e
|
|
|
|
|
Next generation |
USA |
100 |
100 |
Commerclo Ltda. |
Brazil |
100 |
100 |
|
NOA |
USA |
100 |
100 |
Multi Optica Distrlbuidora Ltda.
|
Brazil |
100 |
100 |
|
Omega Optical General Inc. |
USA |
100 |
100 |
Sudop Industria Optica Ltda.
|
Brazil |
100 |
100 |
|
Omega Optical Holdings Inc.
|
USA |
100 |
100 |
Polyl lte
BeIJlng
|
O1ina |
51 |
51 |
|
OOGP |
USA |
BD |
80 |
Polilyte Shanghai |
China |
51 |
51 |
|
Opal Lite Inc. |
USA |
100 |
100 |
Satisloh Zhongshan |
China |
100 |
100 |
|
Optical One |
USA |
80 |
80 |
Satisfoh Schenzen |
China |
100 |
100 |
|
140 |
ESSILOR
-2008 Registration Document and Annual
Financial Report |
|
|
|
Case 2:10-cv-00547-JCC Document 1 Filed
03/30/2010
Page 25 of 26
EXHIBITB
Case 2: 1 0-cv-00547 -JCC
Document 1
.. .
@)
Filed 03/30/2010
Page 26 of 26
essiLor
NEWS RELEASE
Essilor agrees to acquire Signet
Armorlite
Cherenton-le-Pont (January 15, 2009 -
6:30 a.m.) - Essllor International announced today that its US
subsidiary, EOA Holding Go. Inc., has signed a share purchase agreement
whereby it has offered to
acquire the entire capital of Signet Armorlite, a manufacturer of ophthalmic
lenses. The agreement is
subject to certain standard conditions precedent, including approval by
competition authorities in Signet
Armorlite's main host countries .
The acquisition is expected to be completed
in the first half of the year.
Headquartered in California in the United States, it
has revenues of over $130 million ,
approximately
900 employees, one manufacturing plant in Mexico, four prescription laboratories
in the United States
and Europe, and three distribution centers in Canada, Portugal and the
Netherlands.
Signet Armorllte specializes in entry-level and
mid-range products for independent eyecare
professionals and integrated retailers. It also manufactures lenses under the
Kodak brand, for which it is
the exclusive licensed manufacturer and distributor. Led by its current
management team ,
Signet
Armorlite will continue to produce, market and distribute ophthalmic lenses
under the Kodak brand.
Essilor International is the world leader in
ophthalmic optical products, offering a
wide range of lenses
under the flagship vetilux", cnzet",
Essilo,s and Detinity" brands to correct
myopia, hyperopia,
presbyopia and astigmatism. Essilor operates worldwide through
15 production sites, 270 lens finishing
laboratories and focal distribution networks. The Essilor share trades on the
Euronext Paris market and
is included in the GAG 40 index. (lSIN: FR 0000121667; Reuters: ESSf.PA;
Bloomberg: EI:FP).
Investor Relations and Financial
Communications
Veronique Gillet - Sebastlen Leroy
Phone; +33 (0)149774216
www.essllor.com
1/1
| Agency: |
Federal Trade Commission |
FTC Document
| Comment Number: |
547136-00001 |
| Received: |
3/3/2010 7:19:44 PM |
| Organization: |
Opti-Con Inc. |
| Commenter: |
David Panichello |
| State: |
OR |
| Agency: |
Federal Trade Commission |
| Rule: |
Proposed Consent Agreement In the Matter of Transitions Optical,
Inc., FTC File No. 091-0062 |
| No Attachments |
Comments:
To whom it may concern: This is a response to your ruling "against" Transitions
Optical. Although the issues between manufacturers of photochromic materials
"should" be resolved with your 4-0 vote and ruling, please look at the "bigger"
picture with Essilor in the focus of your lenses. You must be aware Essilor is a
49% shareholder of Transitions Optical with PPG Industries. The FTC has not done
enough to limit the domination Essilor continues to have in the wholesale
manufacturing of optical lenses with or without this ruling. We expect Essilor
uses the profits from all of its world wide businesses to nearly completely
dominate the wholesale optical lens manufacturing business in the United States
today. Although the "rest of the world" is outside of the United States, and
outside of our United States Department of Justice system, Essilor now nearly
completely dominates the Australian wholesale optical lens market today, for
example. Essilor uses aggressive tactics to gain market share with coupons for
"free" product, free anti-reflective coatings, and more, for which independently
owned companies cannot compete. Add "buying up" other wholesale optical
laboratories, Essilor has near total domination in the United States today.
Essilor continues to purchase companies in the United States nearly every month.
These purchases are more often purchases of 80% of the company stock with a
"buy-out" later on (sometimes in two years), if the "sales of the business are
maintained". And if you wish to really know the "real" numbers of wholesale
optical laboratories that Essilor actually purchases, the companies purchased,
and for how much, we suggest you subpeona the records of HPC Puckett & Company:
Thomas F. Puckett Managing Director PO Box 9063 Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067
858-756-4915 Office 858-204-8777 They also have a Topeka Office: Jason A. Meyer
Managing Director 5835 SW 29th Street Suite 203 Topeka, KS 66614 785-273-0017
Office 785-845-7550 Mobile HPC Puckett & Company advertise "We continue to serve
the Optical and Communications Industries in completing over $7.0 Billion in
transactions for our clients." The FTC is "asleep at the wheel" in regards to
Essilor, overall. It appears the FTC thinks that the total domination of the
wholesale optical business in the United States today by three companies is
enough competition for Essilor, with Essilor being one of the three. The general
public is not aware how they are effected, only that their glasses come "from
somewhere else." Essentially, Essilor can do what it wants, any time, any place.
The largest wholesale optical business in the United States today is Essilor, a
French company. It is also the largest on Earth. The second and third players in
the United States today are Zeiss and Hoya. German and Japanese ownership,
respectively. Don't overlook Vision Service Plan either. VSP is now using
"mergers and acquisitions" in the same way as Essilor. Using history as your
guide, we suggest you look up Bausch and Lomb, and American Optical. These
companies are your guide as to what happened a few decades ago, and what to do
about it. The FTC came in and "fixed" the problem of "domination". You can do
the same today. It is time for the FTC to come in and "fix" the problem of
domination of the wholesale optical lens manufacturing business again, only the
current company name now, is Essilor. Respectfully submitted.
Essilor
acquires Signet Armorlite, exclusive manufacturer of KODAK Lenses
Charenton-le-Pont, France (April
2, 2010 – 6:30 a.m. CET)
– Following approval by the US
competition authorities, Essilor has completed its acquisition of Signet
Armorlite, a leading independent manufacturer of ophthalmic lenses. Based in
California, Signet Armorlite, Inc. generates a global revenue of approximately
$115 million, primarily through its subsidiaries in the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Columbia, Portugal and Holland.
Holding an exclusive worldwide
license for the development, production and distribution of Kodak® brand lenses,
Signet Armorlite markets a product portfolio that is strategically aligned with
Essilor’s offering. The acquisition will enable Essilor to strengthen its
positions in the high-quality mid-range segment. Operated independently by the
current management team, Signet Armorlite will leverage Essilor’s distribution
network to promote the Kodak® brand and reach new customers and consumers around
the world.
“The acquisition of Signet
Armorlite illustrates Essilor’s strategy of offering product and service lineups
tailored to each segment of the ophthalmic optics market,” said Hubert Sagnières,
Chief Executive Officer of Essilor International. “We’re going to capitalize on
our Company’s size as well as its extensive research and development
capabilities to increase the opportunities for the Kodak brand in the
international ophthalmic marketplace.”
“We see excellent synergies between the
strength of our Kodak brand and Essilor’s leading position in the worldwide
ophthalmic market,” said Brad Kruchten, president of Kodak’s Film,
Photofinishing and Entertainment Group. “We are confident that this combination
will insure the Kodak brand has a substantial position in vision care moving
forward.”
Essilor of America Launches MyOnlineOptical.com
Posted by
The Eyeglasses Guy on March 26, 2010 ·
Following a Successful Beta Test, Essilor to
Provide E-Commerce Solution for All ECPs
DALLAS
– (March 26, 2010) – Essilor of America, Inc., the nation’s
leading manufacturer of optical lenses, today announces the
launch of its MyOnlineOptical.com e-commerce solution
for independent eyecare professionals (ECPs). Following a
successful Beta test with a limited number of ECPs, in
partnership with
FramesDirect.com, Essilor has expanded the availability of
the offering which enables ECPs to provide optical products
online to their current and future patients.
In order to secure the technology and deploy this
industry-leading solution to all ECPs, Essilor has acquired a
majority stake in FramesDirect.com.
“E-commerce is rapidly emerging in our industry as more
consumers enjoy the convenience of online purchasing,” said John
Carrier, president, Essilor of America. “However, a solution
including the ECP did not exist and our research indicated that
most ECPs felt ill-equipped to compete. As long time industry
partners, Essilor felt responsible to provide our customers with
a solution to meet this challenge.”
“Eyeglass e-commerce is undeniably becoming a reality in
today’s ophthalmic industry worldwide,” said Randolph E. Brooks,
O.D., American Optometric Association (AOA) president. “We’ve
received positive feedback from the Beta test and believe that
MyOnlineOptical.com will provide optometrists with an
opportunity to compete with online entities by offering
additional visual correction solutions, and therefore increase
patient retention and promote healthy practice growth.”
Essilor’s MyOnlineOptical.com allows ECPs to add a
turnkey e-commerce engine that extends their reach beyond office
walls and office hours to 24/7 accessibility. ECPs maintain
complete control, determining the product pricing and selection,
and preserving the look and feel of their practice Web sites.
ECPs can provide patients with up to 100,000 eyeglass options,
and keep them from walking out the door to a competitive
offering. The MyOnlineOptical.com solution will allow
ECPs to offer patients a secure, convenient and robust online
purchasing tool for eyewear, while saving on staff time and
inventory.
“MyOnlineOptical.com has given me a valuable tool to
compete in the online global marketplace,” said Kim Castleberry,
OD. “My patients like the selection and convenience of
purchasing products online and my practice bottom line is
enhanced. Moreover, it has not increased my overhead. I’m not
sure what the future holds for online optical sales, but I do
know I have a tool to compete, thanks to Essilor.”
For more information, go to
www.MyOnlineOptical.com. Any comments or questions about
this Internet initiative should be addressed to MyOnlineOptical@essilorusa.com.
|